Also remember we Argentinians suffered a bloody dictatorship in the 70s, complete with illegal detentions, torture and executions, and while of course the military renews itself with new people, some sectors of it still haven't come to terms with their past (some remain who actually sympathize with the dictatorship or were involved in it).
So no, what you're describing is not the full picture.
I even saw a higher up personally helping once, I was in an open source tech conference, and a colonel was present to show the air force work using Ubuntu and Debian, while chatting with him he got a phone call about a radar issue, he immediately picked up a laptop and started to fire up some domestic made tech and started helping the operators directly.
If the timing wasn't seemly so random I would think they did it on purpose just to show off the cool tech.
In battle, overriding a safety feature might be the difference between returning fire and saving the ship and crew, or losing all hands.
The mentality is changing a lot and I'm starting to see safety requirements in contracts and more and more frequent audits from customers on the topic (even though it wasn't in the spirit of things or the contract when system was designed, ugh...) and it's very, very hard to retrofit safety and personel safety in a product line, codebase, system design, and especially in the daily reflexes of systems or sw engineers. Everyone seems to overshoot ("safety says we must do X" - well no it's still an engineering compromise you still have choices and trade-offs - "but safety!" - yes, let's go back to the safety plan, what are the critical elements, what are the failure modes, what are the chances, what is the expected system response?...)
It's particularly tough for those teams that have to swallow the double firehose of safety and "cyber"-security :-D