I agree somewhat but there has been significant progress to sandbox containers with the same security we'd expect from a VM. It isn't a ridiculous idea that VMs will one day be antiquated, but probably won't happen for a few more years.
I agree somewhat but there has been significant progress to sandbox containers with the same security we'd expect from a VM. It isn't a ridiculous idea that VMs will one day be antiquated, but probably won't happen for a few more years.
https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-poli...
> As of Kubernetes v1.19, you can use the seccompProfile field in the securityContext of Pods or containers to control use of seccomp profiles.
If you're looking for a more general abstraction, there is gVisor and others as well.
Which leaves you to either use something like firecracker or gvisor which are either virtualization solutions or the next closest thing in that they intermediate all of your syscalls?
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/53024790/kubernetes-supp...
There is an issue that I've been tracking, and there has been a new PR that will hopefully land soon to implement this in Kubernetes in a simplified manner:
https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/127
As for whether security policies prevent breakouts, it really depends on what the exploit is but they can significantly help. The idea of user namespace remapping solves a secondary issue though... if there is a breakout, what user privileges will they have.
*not a security person or an expert on singularity but it advertises that it doesn’t do file system or user isolation by default
I imagine CPU and memory namespaces coming implemented on hardware isolation features like VT-d io-mmus and alike thus making virtual machines integrated into some sandboxing feature.