Which is to say, with great caution- and not like regular science but rather like the kind of science with potentially very negative externalities.
Which is to say, with great caution- and not like regular science but rather like the kind of science with potentially very negative externalities.
This typo demands an xkcd!
For instance, a steel mill producing rolling stock to sell me releases sulfur into the air that dirties your property, imposing a cost on you.
Prion research doesn't necessarily impose costs on anyone.
It would be like me saying the theory of relativity just means a theory about how everything is relative. That's obviously wrong. You can't just break down academic terms into their separate words. It doesn't make sense.
There's no difference between a steel mill leaking sulphur in the course of producing steel and a biotech company releasing prions in the course of producing medicines. Radiation leaks in the course of producing electricity are likewise externalities.
However, you CAN research diseases without having accidental lab leaks. Thousands of labs around the world do this perfectly fine year in, year out. That's the way it's normally done. The process of researching diseases does not inherently impose costs on anyone else.
Labs don't continuously spew out diseases, but they very much must impose the risk of such releases upon others. That is the cost. It costs money to insure against risk, even if the disaster never comes to pass. If a biotech company reduces its costs by implementing looser safety policies thus increasing risk to the surrounding population, that cost is borne externally. Hence the name.
Similarly, dangerous jobs impose a societal health burden via workplace accidents. Each accident is one-off but in aggregate, a non-zero accident rate is a certain outcome.
Containment breaches of contagious diseases, while each a one-off event, are effectively certain over large enough sample sizes- and therefore should be considered as part of the cost of doing research into them.
The threat of WMD terror hasn't materialized in a meaningful way: intact, state-manufactured nuclear weapons are the only plausible weapons non-state actors can realistically handle without killing themselves with them, and even that's pretty questionable: it's not easy to detonate a nuclear bomb.
Chemicals are even worse: it's pretty easy for a chemistry student to accidentally make organophosphates, but terror groups don't try in any substantial way - you're as likely to poison yourself as anyone else.
Biologicals are the worst: screw up and they infect you and then the rest of your organisation - or you have a power cut and everything dies in the test tube.
Not necessarily. If you can somehow pull off a food supply chain attack which creates the perception that a lot of food may have been contaminated with prions, that could potentially very effectively induce a state of mass terror. Symptoms take years to manifest; can't be fully diagnosed until you're already dead; inevitably fatal.
It could potentially turn half of a country into (somewhat rational) hypochondriacs, even if almost no one actually became infected. And if it were confirmed that a lot of people were infected, that'd ramp up the fear much more. Also, the cost of pulling it off is probably much lower than the cost of detonating a dirty bomb or even a full nuclear bomb, while potentially achieving a much stronger effect.
>The threat of WMD terror hasn't materialized in a meaningful way: intact, state-manufactured nuclear weapons are the only plausible weapons non-state actors can realistically handle without killing themselves with them, and even that's pretty questionable: it's not easy to detonate a nuclear bomb.
I kind of disagree. Nuclear weapons seem like they probably won't be viable for terrorism for a very long time, if ever, but I don't think they're the only plausible weapons that can realistically be handled. Look at Aum Shinrikyo and their various planned, attempted, and successful chemical and biological attacks in the 90s. They killed 27 and injured over 6,000 people, but they came very close to potentially killing or debilitating tens of thousands.
There's definitely a risk of being injured or dying in the process, but they took (largely effective) precautions to prevent that. You can also do things like use binary agents which only activate when combined. But, perhaps most importantly, terrorists (regardless of motive/ideology) often fully accept and welcome that they may be harmed or killed in the process, so the risk isn't a big deterrent.
I suspect that within this century, at least one terrorist/cult/lone wolf chemical and/or biological attack is going to come close to, or succeed at, killing a large number of people, and I think the threat of future attacks may paralyze a lot of societies.