That by itself makes it look ok.
Until you consider… there are a couple counterarguments.
One, Apple has not actually enabled such private encryption with the keys out of reach to Apple for iCloud backups.
Two, that child protection in other countries will sometimes be defined in such repugnant terms that it will compromise Apple fully to scan for the hashes provided by “child protection” organizations in those countries.
“Child protection” is in quotes not because I think countries will get away with shoehorning, say, terrorist content hashes in as purported child pornography hashes. It’s in quotes because the concept of child protection can be so wildly bizarrely corrupted in some countries for religious or ideological reasons. Who decides what is off limits for children, from having gay parents, to having friends of the opposite sex, to having an unislamic head covering? Well, each random government, of course, with Apple as the enabler, and individual and human rights be damned.
So while the most charitably viewed end game may be good, they seem to be papering over the real impacts this could have.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EARN_IT_Act_of_2020
Big tech companies are under a lot of US govt pressure right now to crack down on CSAM, most especially Apple because of their very low number of reports compared to most other tech giants. I think Apple saw this as a way to ease some of that government pressure while not jeopardizing their ability to use end-to-end encryption, which something like the EARN IT Act could effectively make illegal by requiring a government backdoor for all encrypted cloud services that operate in the US.
Apple probably saw the on-device CSAM scanning as a small, widely-acceptable concession to make that could prevent much bigger crackdowns, but maybe didn't anticipate the level of blowback from people seeing the CSAM scanning itself as an unacceptable government backdoor on their own device.