If you're in close physical contact with a person (like at a job) you just wait for them to put their phone down while unlocked, and do all this.
> If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them.
If you didn't have Apple scanning your drive trying to find a new way for you to go to prison then it wouldn't be a problem.
Also, most other major cloud photo providers scan images server side, leading to the same effect (but with them accessing more data).
People are getting nerd-sniped about hash collisions. It's completely irrelevant.
The real-world vector is that an attacker sends CSAM through one of the channels that will trigger a scan. Through iMessage, this should be possible in an unsolicited fashion (correct me if I'm wrong). Otherwise, it's possible through a hacked device. Of course there's plausible deniability here, but like with swatting, it's not a situation you want to be in.
Sure, but those don’t go into your photo library, so it won’t trigger any scanning. Presumably people wouldn’t actively save CSAM into their library.
If you don't like someone (which happens very often in this line of work) you could potentially screw someone over with this.