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Why is it bizarre? The Wasm function interface seems perfect for sandboxing code. It's a "whitelist" system, the contained process can only call external functions that have been explicitly attached, perfect for implementing the capability security paradigm and progressively hollowing out the attack surface by separating functionality into several instances.

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Requiring compilation to WASM to then translate it back to C and compile it again might be a bit strange. Clang obviously already has the tools to do the WASM sanitizing, it might be really cool to have a way to directly enforce those rules outside of WASM.

As I understand it, clang doesn't have the tools to sanitize WASM. It just emits WASM, which, malicious or benevolent, can't access memory outside its designated memory regions.

It's wasm2c job to ensure that the C generated enforces the WASM memory rules, so I'd say the one sanitizing the code is not clang but wasm2c.

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