The result of these efforts is that ZKPs have gone from a academic curiosity to widely productionized tech. this stuff is beyond the wildest dreams of people like David Chaum.
The result of these efforts is that ZKPs have gone from a academic curiosity to widely productionized tech. this stuff is beyond the wildest dreams of people like David Chaum.
David Chaum dreamed about a world where electronic payments could be anonymous and secure, but the demand was not there and his startup never took off. "Blockchain" sucked most of the oxygen out of the room when it comes to further work on ecash, which is unfortunate given that even the most technically complex ecash proposals were overwhelmingly more efficient than any blockchain-based payment tech ever could be. For what it's worth, the most recent ecash proposals also advanced the research on NIZKs and ZKPs more generally (it is actually hard to avoid some kind of NIZK in a system that supports offline payments) and had ecash been deployed more widely we probably would have seen at least as much research and productionization activity as we see in the blockchain space.
On the other hand, blockchain research has struggled with a foundational question that does not present a problem for any of the technology I mentioned above: how to properly define security. Especially in the permissionless setting the effort on defining security has been unconvincing so far, requiring a very stretched approach to formalizing computational resources that is hard to actually map onto a real-world application. Satoshi did not start with a well-defined problem he was trying to solve with Bitcoin, and such an approach -- clearly identifying the problem you are actually trying to solve and verifying that the definition is logically consistent and realistic -- is exceedingly rare in the blockchain space, while in mainstream cryptography research it is a de facto requirement. So while blockchain tech has not experienced a spectacular failure due to some theoretical shortcomings, the theory itself is not well developed compared to the theory of cryptography in general (including ecash, which can be rigorously defined and proposed systems can be proved to satisfy the definition).
Furthermore, the MPC deployments you speak of are rather small-scale, there have been no deployments of general-purpose MPC beyond maybe the sugar beets auction.
As for zerocash, the last time I looked into it what I saw were a set of security definitions that assume a reliable ledger of some kind; whether or not that ledger is implemented using a blockchain at all is not addressed in the theoretical work. The practical deployment relied on Bitcoin, but since Bitcoin security is not well-defined (or at least not convincingly defined) that makes the rest of the security argument dubious. As far as I know Zexe has the same problem: yes, the security definition is much stronger, but they do not address the realization of the ledger functionality itself and thus any real-world deployment that relies on e.g. Bitcoin, or really any permissionless blockchain, has the same theoretical shortcomings. Ultimately the permissionless setting itself is the problem; zerocoin could be implemented using a ledger managed by a trusted party, and it would achieve its security goals without those theoretical problems.
I should also be clear that when I say ecash does not share this problem, it is because ecash has a well-defined security model and all functionalities needed to realize an ecash system also have well-defined security. We can instantiate ecash using any of the security assumptions we commonly use for digital signatures, and in theory ecash can be instantiated from MPC (by using a generic MPC protocol to implement a blind signature, then using the blind signature to implement ecash), which itself can be instantiated with standard cryptographic assumptions. So ecash has a security definition that is as well-defined as a cryptographic security definition can be.
Re: MPC deployments, the point about deploying general-purpose MPC is that it’s a much more complex task than specialized protocols. That’s why I specified general-purpose zkps; we already have ubiquitous deployments of specialized zkps (I.e. digital signatures). And maybe your project indeed has a large scale MPC deployment, that’s awesome. Doesn’t take away from the fact that cryptocurrencies are pushing zkp innovation at unprecedented rates.
Engineering effort is not what holds back the deployment of generic MPC protocols. Those protocols are just too expensive to run in the majority of real-world MPC applications. Even special-purpose protocols are sometimes too resource-intensive to be deployed. I do not see that situation changing without a radically different approach to generic protocols. I also do not understand what is so uniquely exciting about deploying a generic ZKP or MPC protocol. If it works in a giving setting and no special-purpose construction could be used, great, but it is not some kind of badge of honor.
As for Zerocash, you had originally said that blockchains are where we can finding the largest deployments of non-trivial ZKPs, which is why I pointed out that Zerocash and its followup work do not really involve "blockchains" beyond a particular instantiation of a ledger. If the construction can be implemented without any blockchain at all -- which the authors of the original paper took the time to point out -- then I do not see how any of the research on ZKPs motivated by Zerocash and its followup work supports your claim at all. You are saying that Zerocash is actually ecash, which kind of makes my point for me: we are not actually talking about something in the "blockchain space."
(Also, I have a somewhat controversial view that NIZKs and signatures are not actually "zero knowledge," since the verifier obviously cannot compute a NIZK or signature without receiving a message from the prover/signer and thus gains knowledge when it does receive those strings. Not that it matters in any way for this conversation, since the value of innovation in NIZKs or ZKSNARKs is not in doubt, but I did want to mention that signatures are a poor example of real-world deployments of ZKPs.)