Is this MicroG? https://microg.org/
Is this MicroG? https://microg.org/
The way it works in GrapheneOS is that the OS redirects Binder connections (an IPC mechanism in Android) to a trusted, bundled app (GmsCompat) which will only implement the Play services location API in the foreseeable future. The rest of the Google Play functionality is implemented by GMS itself.
[1] https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#microg...
To be honest, I understand the potentially good intentions behind Google's push to manage keys for app developers. It is not trivial to (1) keep private keys secure, and (2) not lose access to them over a long enough period of time. So Google can store them in HSMs in their datacenters and provide backups and access controls and such. But it also gives them the ability to deliver app updates with "extra stuff" for targeted individuals. See Figure 1 of [1]. That doesn't look very nice to me.
[1] https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing
I wonder if there's an internal fight between the Tools and Play teams, because all of this should be possible via the Gradle plugin, but understandably the Play team probably wouldn't see high adoption of APK splits if it required configuration via the morass of crap that is Gradle.
It is pretty typical of Google to choose the most invasive solution.
>The signature spoofing could be an unsafe feature only if the user blindly gives any permission to any app, as this permission can't be obtained automatically by the apps. Moreover, to further strengthen the security of our ROM, we modified the signature spoofing permission so that only system privileged apps can obtain it, and no security threat is posed to our users.