OpenBSD's non-blocking design, as you've described it, isn't secure if that file isn't writeable. The security of the design assumes that file is writeable. It may not crash, but instead it "fails open."
There have been too many examples of seed files being reused, it's time to recognize that requiring a unique seed file is not good property for an RNG to have.
The first file, /etc/random.seed is 512 bytes and is available very early as it's on the root filesystem. This file is re-written by rc(8) at every boot, halt, shutdown, and reboot.
Second, /var/db/host.random is 65536 bytes. It is also re-written by rc at every boot, halt, shutdown and reboot.
In addition to all that, rc includes:
# If bootblocks failed to give us random, try to cause some churn
(dmesg; sysctl hw.{uuid,serialno,sensors} ) >/dev/random 2>&1
I just checked my VMs and they all print unique values for dmesg, hw.uuid and hw.serialno. I can guess but I don't know how hw.uuid and hw.serialno are set.