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Whether you'd like that particular house to have a door is a different matter entirely, but the design of Taler seems to be aiming for "let's make digital cash that a central bank might actually want to issue" and VAT is absolutely a part of that.
While this is a very different idea than decentralized cryptocurrencies, what it would give us as consumers is a much more privacy-preserving alternative to credit cards, Apple Pay and PayPal when buying things online (or in a store). At the same time, it is controllable enough for governments and banks that they could consider introducing such a system.
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion on the 1974 California Bankers Association v Shultz case that upheld the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act, provided an excellent argument against warrantless mass-surveillance of monetary transactions:
It is estimated that a minimum of 20 billion checks - and perhaps 30 billion - will have to be photocopied and that the weight of these little pieces of paper will approximate 166 million pounds a year. 6
It would be highly useful to governmental espionage to have like reports from all our bookstores, all our hardware [416 U.S. 21, 85] and retail stores, all our drugstores. These records too might be "useful" in criminal investigations.
One's reading habits furnish telltale clues to those who are bent on bending us to one point of view. What one buys at the hardware and retail stores may furnish clues to potential uses of wires, soap powders, and the like used by criminals. A mandatory recording of all telephone conversations would be better than the recording of checks under the Bank Secrecy Act, if Big Brother is to have his way. The records of checks - now available to the investigators - are highly useful. In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum. These are all tied to one's social security number; and now that we have the data banks, these other items will enrich that storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat - by pushing one button - to get in an instant the names of the 190 million Americans who are subversives or potential and likely candidates.
It is, I submit, sheer nonsense to agree with the Secretary that all bank records of every citizen "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." That is unadulterated nonsense unless we are to assume that every citizen is a crook, an assumption I cannot make.
Since the banking transactions of an individual give a fairly accurate account of his religion, ideology, opinions, and interests, a regulation impounding them and making them automatically available to all federal investigative agencies is a sledge-hammer approach to a problem that only a delicate scalpel can manage. Where fundamental personal rights are involved - as is true when as here the [416 U.S. 21, 86] Government gets large access to one's beliefs, ideas, politics, religion, cultural concerns, and the like - the Act should be "narrowly drawn" (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 ) to meet the precise evil. 7 Bank accounts at times harbor criminal plans. But we only rush with the crowd when we vent on our banks and their customers the devastating and leveling requirements of the present Act. I am not yet ready to agree that America is so possessed with evil that we must level all constitutional barriers to give our civil authorities the tools to catch criminals.
Instituting mass surveillance of monetary transactions creates extreme centralizations of power, and the kind of all-powerful government you're advocating creating is a giant magnet for rent-seeking behaviour.
As far as I'm concerned, this is an arbitrary distinction to rationalize depriving some class of interactions between individuals of the right to privacy.
>>At the same time, it is controllable enough for governments and banks that they could consider introducing such a system.
I find this very defeatist, and this attitude becoming pervasive would guarantee that the trend toward mass-surveillance of all private interactions would continue unabated.
Perhaps it's true that this is the type of system that governments and banks might be willing to introduce today. Afterall, privacy in financial interaction is not acceptable to the mainstream institutions. Over the last century, and especially since the early 1990s, the Overton window has shifted toward greater state control and less privacy. The proof of this is in the fact if cash were introduced today, it would be made illegal. And instead of pushing back against this trend toward mass-surveillance, Taler cows to it, with ideological rationalizations to boot.
Cryptocurrency has a real potential to reverse the trend towards a dystopian surveillance state controlled by a handful of governments and payment processors, and the people behind Taler are too enamoured with their left-wing political ideology, and visions of taxing every one, to support it.
https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/all-about-encryption-backdo...
This is a backdoor, and puts to a lie the idea that this is in any way "anonymous". It's a tool of the state, to further centralize power around it.
>>An encryption backdoor is any method that allows a user (whether authorized or not) to bypass encryption and gain access to a system.
Nothing in there about the method having to be covert.
When the Clipper Chip was proposed in the early 1990s, or when governments publicly propose encryption bypasses today, the mainstream news coverage refers to these mechanisms as "backdoors", despite no covert element in it.
The "SSLStore" is not the definitive source on the definition of a backdoor. It's just an EV certificate merchant.
Authorization plays a role in whether or not something is a backdoor. It's not a rigid definition because language isn't actually rigid, backdoors are defined in part by whether or not they're expected and wanted by the end-user, which is inherently a fuzzy category. But it's silly to say that any access method authorized or not is a backdoor, by that logic my own encrypted computer hard drive has a glaring backdoor in the form of me knowing the passphrase for it.
https://www.klemchuk.com/ideate/encryption-backdoors-and-bal...
Pubicly proposed interception mechanisms, like the Clipper Chip, were widely referred to as a backdoor, as have those put forth by the UK government recently for encrypted messaging apps
https://www.express.co.uk/life-style/science-technology/1556...
>>backdoors are defined in part by whether or not they're expected and wanted by the end-user,
This would not be wanted by the end-user. The backdoor in this case is just an imposition on the receiving party, i.e. the merchant, that they'd rather do without.
No tool to let the state eavesdrop on or surveil one's private affairs is wanted by the party being subjected to it. This is unequivocally a backdoor, and it would only win out in the market if tools without backdoors are eliminated from the market by the state, using the state's apparatus of violence (the police, courts and prisons that gain compliance with government edicts).
Random company blogs and random UK news blogs aren't the authorities on what a backdoor is.
You look at something like, for example, Wikipedia, and it basically agrees with my take above: backdoors are usually covert, but are intrinsically somewhat fuzzy to define. This is how the word is typically used in common conversation.
> This would not be wanted by the end-user. The backdoor in this case is just an imposition on the receiving party, i.e. the merchant, that they'd rather do without.
Speak for yourself, this is literally the selling point of GNU Taler, this is one of the reasons people are interested in it. They put "taxable" in the tagline not just out of an interest in transparency but because it's their main "hook" to get people interested in the system.
Once again, I talked about this above, but backdoors are a fuzzy concept where different communities can end up with different conclusions about what does or doesn't fall into the category of a backdoor. The fact that you personally don't want income levels for merchants to be auditable by the state does not mean no one else wants that transparency (merchants included).
Once again, taking that idea to its logical conclusion would be absurd. A nontrivial number of software merchants would like it if my browser didn't have inspector tools and didn't let me look at the source code of pages that they sent me. A lot of web publishers would like it if browsers didn't have tools that let people intercept and modify HTML before it gets rendered to the page. That doesn't mean my browser inspector or my adblocker is a backdoor. These terms are in part socially defined, and yes, expectation and transparency are a part of how we do that. They're not the only part, but they are a part.
You posit a world where any disclosure of any information where anyone would prefer that information to be private is a backdoor, and that broadens the definition of a backdoor beyond the point of usefulness and beyond the scope of how most people and most articles online use the term.
Yes, you can try to use Bitcoin/Ethereum pseudonymously, but you can also try to use Taler pseudonymously, and yes you can try to mix up your coins to obscure specific transactions, but you can also try to mix up your transactions and do money laundering on Taler too. Basically any privacy measure that Bitcoin tries to add on top of the blockchain to get around its more fundamental privacy problem could also be applied on top of Taler, including things like shared wallets, mixers, transaction rollups, etc...
By your definition of what a backdoor is, it seems like Taler is meaningfully less backdoored and meaningfully more private than most cryptocurrencies, including Ethereum. That's especially true once currency/coin exchanges enter the mix.
That's not a backdoor, as it's not a method whereby a select few can view private information. Moreover, there are various methods, especially in Ethereum, where this private information can be hidden, like zk-SNARK-based mixing contracts that break the publicly visible link between deposits and withdrawals to it.
Ethereum's lack of privacy is a result of the attempt to allow global auditibility of the validity of transactions. There was no design goal of making it possible to spy on Ethereum transactions. That was an unintended side-effect, and as methods have been created to avoid that side-effect, they have been implemented by end users. Taler's design on the other hand breaks privacy intentionally, for the sake of preventing people from escaping taxation mandates.
Oh, cool, then Taler also doesn't have a backdoor, since its auditability is also not a method by which a select few can view private information.
> Moreover, there are various methods, especially in Ethereum, where this private information can be hidden, like zk-SNARK-based mixing contracts that break the publicly visible link between deposits and withdrawals to it.
Cool, you can also try to mix your transactions on Taler, so another point towards Taler not having backdoors.
> Ethereum's lack of privacy is a result of the attempt to allow global auditibility of the validity of transactions.
So what you're saying is a deliberate design decision to allow auditing as part of the core design of a product isn't a backdoor? Cool, then Taler doesn't have a backdoor. Note that Taler's auditing design is more private than Ethereum's, it leaks less information to accomplish the same goal.
> breaks privacy intentionally, for the sake of preventing people from escaping taxation mandates
Also known as auditability. Ethereum's design breaks privacy intentionally, for the sake of preventing people from double-spending.
The group that can view the private information in Taler is limited to the state.
>>Cool, you can also try to mix your transactions on Taler, so another point towards Taler not having backdoors.
On the list of features on the Taler website, it says the following:
>>Customers can stay anonymous, but merchants can not hide their income through payments with GNU Taler. This helps to avoid tax evasion and money laundering.
I think you're being disingenuous in implying that a non-backdoored version of Taler would still fit the description the Taler website itself gives for the software.
>>So what you're saying is a deliberate design decision to allow auditing as part of the core design of a product isn't a backdoor?
* Auditing of the validity of the transactions that doesn't require exposing private information to third parties
* Auditing by everyone, not a select few with privileged backdoor access.
A version of Taler that didn't allow auditability wouldn't fit the description on its website, correct. That has nothing to do with whether or not it's a "backdoor", and more importantly, it has nothing to do with whether or not it's a desirable part of the functionality, regardless of whether or not you want to call it a backdoor.
Again, we can say the same about Bitcoin. I think you're being disingenuous in implying that a non-backdoored version of Bitcoin wouldn't allow double-spending. Theoretically Monero might fit the bill, but given that neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum have adopted Monero's transaction model, it's pretty obvious that the maintainers/community don't view plugging that hole as a priority.
> Auditing of the validity of the transactions that doesn't require exposing private information to third parties
> Auditing by everyone, not a select few with privileged backdoor access.
This is an interesting criticism, because Bitcoin objectively exposes more information to 3rd parties than Taler does. What you're arguing to me is that Bitcoin is more private because it exposes my information to literally everyone, and not to a limited subset of people.
It's like saying that my banking balance isn't private because the bank can check it, but if the bank instead broadcasts all of that same information to all of my employers and anyone who asks, then it's suddenly OK. It's like saying that if my partner has access to my phone that's a backdoor, but if instead Google just lists all of my contacts publicly on a webpage, then it's not a backdoor anymore. It doesn't make any sense, things become more private the fewer people who have access to them.
So the reasonable characterization of Taler's design is that it is backdoored, or as per your euphemization, "allows auditability" by privileged state authorities. Taler cannot remove that feature and still possess its defining qualities.
>>That has nothing to do with whether or not it's a "backdoor",
It has to do with the point you made, which is that Taler could remove that feature. It cannot, and I explained why.
>>I think you're being disingenuous in implying that a non-backdoored version of Bitcoin wouldn't allow double-spending.
Bitcoin is not backdoored. You're completely misdefining the term 'backdoor' now. This is a very bad faith argument from you.
>>Theoretically Monero might fit the bill, but given that neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum have adopted Monero's transaction model, it's pretty obvious that the maintainers/community don't view plugging that hole as a priority.
1. Not making plugging that hold a priority is absolutely not the same as providing state authorities with a backdoor as part of the design goals.
2. As a matter of fact, Bitcoin's LN has all transaction onion routed now. Ethereum has no need to take Monero's road to achieve privacy, as its Turing Complete program execution environment enables private transaction programs like AZTEC Network to run on top of it.
>>What you're arguing to me is that Bitcoin is more private because it exposes my information to literally everyone, and not to a limited subset of people.
I didn't say Bitcoin was more private. I said Bitcoin, Ethereum and other permissionless blockchains weren't definitionally backdoored.
In natural language, the authority on what a word means is just the convention. When any of the top 10 search results I sample for the term 'encryption backdoor' use it in the manner I referred to, It's a safe assumption that this is how the term is conventionally understood, and thus the correct definition of the term.
>>backdoors are usually covert
That doesn't contradict what I said.
>>but are intrinsically somewhat fuzzy to define.
Yes I can agree that the definitions of terms are somewhat fuzzy, but I think I can reasonably call Taler's eavesdropping mechanism a backdoor.
>>The fact that you personally don't want income levels for merchants to be auditable by the state does not mean no one else wants that transparency (merchants included).
Merchants are not going to sign up for this if private options are available on the market. Even merchants that want to disclose their finances to state authorities would want to retain control over when and where they disclose that information, rather than providing a permanent open book to taxing authorities.
>>A nontrivial number of software merchants would like it if my browser didn't have inspector tools and didn't let me look at the source code of pages that they sent me
That's irrelevant to whether it's a backdoor. Your browser is not a tool that they use. It's a tool that you use. Thus inspection tools on it wouldn't be a backdoor by virtue of them wanting you to not have them.
I think at this point you're being pedantic and not discussing this in good faith.
Look, I'm not the person who started word-for-word quoting random blogs to win a technicality fight about how a specific word was being used. You want to escape from pedantry, great. Here's the non-pedantic reality: Taler's ability to audit merchant income streams is meaningfully different from a clipper chip and they should not be compared to each other, regardless of what umbrella term you think they both fall under.
You want the non-pedantic argument about language? Language is (as you say) a convention, it's descriptive not prescriptive -- and the majority of people looking at Taler are saying its design around auditability isn't a backdoor; therefore it's not, because language is descriptive and not perscriptive.
> Merchants are not going to sign up for this if private options are available on the market.
Citation needed.
> Thus inspection tools on it wouldn't be a backdoor by virtue of them wanting you to not have them.
Wat. You're just making things up now.
Taler is designed to deprive people of financial privacy from the state:
https://taler.net/en/features.html
>>Customers can stay anonymous, but merchants can not hide their income through payments with GNU Taler. This helps to avoid tax evasion and money laundering.
It is explicitly anti-privacy for a subset of users.
The comparison to Clipper Chip, outside of pedantic bad-faith misinterpretations of the qualities being compared, is entirely appropriate.
>>the majority of people looking at Taler are saying its design around auditability isn't a backdoor; therefore it's not, because language is descriptive and not perscriptive.
Citation needed.
>>Citation needed.
My assertion is based solely on common sense. Why on Earth would a person want to lose privacy vis-a-vis the state?
>>You're just making things up now.
What part of what I said are you alleging is incorrect?
Taler is designed to make it harder to avoid taxes, it is orthogonal whether or not that impacts privacy. The comparison to the clipper chip is wildly inappropriate, there is a difference between taxation and the ability of the state to monitor literally all encrypted messaging between parties. There is obviously a difference between those two things.
> the majority of people looking at Taler are saying its design around auditability isn't a backdoor; therefore it's not, because language is descriptive and not perscriptive. [...] Citation needed.
That language is descriptive and not perscriptive? Merriam Webster and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
That people widely aren't looking at Taler's design as a backdoor? This comment thread and the responses of security professionals and prominent privacy advocates. Your original comments about a backdoor wouldn't be this far down the page if the community agreed with them. The response to GNU Taler from people embedded in the Free/Libre software movement would be different if people thought this was a covert spying operation. They don't.
> Why on Earth would a person want to lose privacy vis-a-vis the state?
They might like living in a society with public roads. This might be difficult to hear, but the majority of people in the US don't want taxation abolished, that's not a popular political position. It's fine for you to believe that taxation is theft and it's fine for you to advocate that taxation is theft, but even you sincerely believe that taxation is theft you still have to be able to go into these kinds of conversations understanding that's a minority position, even among a lot of people producing and selling goods.