Tie their compensation to real goals and require them to hold for the next 10 years.
Tie their compensation to real goals and require them to hold for the next 10 years.
Now it's in the interest of a CEO to take a performing company carve out the middle so profits go up in the short term, shareholders get more money, he gets fat bonuses and the company dies.
Though there were problems with the old style too - they became very conservative and couldn't adapt among other things.
When the board members taking their gains and re-investing them in other companies to then repeat this strategy.
There's still an agency problem between the shareholders and board members, but at least the shareholder votes will be weighted for the long haul. Locked shares would have to be held in a way that prevents wrapping them in a salable derivative.
This would have a significant impact on encouraging long-term investing for investors and long-term planning for companies.
This should apply only to shares in individual companies and not index funds or mutual funds.
It would also encourage a shift away from short-term speculation and to long-term investing in great companies.
Where I live stocks profits are taxed at 20% at first, then 5% less for each 5 years you hold them, down to 0 taxation after 20 years.
Also, this kind of progressive tax reduction should only apply after the company is public. So the clock for VCs, founders, etc only starts at the time of the IPO.
This would ensure all the early stakeholders are also aligned in investing in the long-term success of the business.
Currently, these early stakeholders are more likely to be focused on cashing out and having a liquidity event.
Perhaps you could get a longer-term effect if you had another, lower tax level at 5+ years, or raised moderately the 1+ year cap gains rate and moved the current one to 5 years.
With that incentive severely reduced as your plan proposes, you’ll see much Miles’s incentive to hold and more volatile markets.
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/10151...
Boards often want the same thing because members usually own stock in the company. Make a lot of money in the short term, pump that into stock buybacks, profit. Shareholders want the same thing - they often aren't looking past the next 1-4 quarters, they want fast returns.
Maybe that's the root of it and long-term capital gains should take longer than 1 year. The owners have a shorter horizon than employees!
If companies inevitable self-destruct from short-term management, that creates space for new companies to emerge with new approaches. Sure, there will be some noise/churn but overall I think it makes the overall ecosystem stronger.
The 1,000-year monopoly is a terrifying idea.
Perhaps people who are interested in building great companies, like the regulars of a tech startup-centric forum
It would be much worse if the big incumbents all remained at the top and dug themselves into the regulators and politicians and crowded out others (they already do to a great extent but it could be a lot worse).
Uncertainty and risk are big reasons why people fear change, I completely understand. I'm not saying the feeling or desire for stable incumbents is invalid, although maybe my comment could have been worded a bit better.
That's the sort of bespoke governance that Eric Ries' Long Term Stock Exchange is meant to enable and support.
- short term-ism leads to great financial results in the short term so the stock price goes up making a buy out expensive. Anyone that can see the internal issues will know it's not worth that price.
- very few groups can make an offer on companies as large as Intel and Boeing. Those groups are not known for deep engineering expertise.
- companies use poison pills and other measures to prevent take overs
You have more faith in public markets than I do.