Huge difference. Whonix consists of two VMs, one where you actually work and another which acts as a "router" sending all of your traffic out over Tor.
Code running in the work VM can't leak your IP even with root access.
Code running in the work VM can't leak your IP even with root access.
Nobody is advised to run Tails in a VM, only as the host OS, so the dual VM part isn't that relevant.
I've used both, only pointing out how your response didn't match
The article does briefly mention Tails and how it does a RAM rewrite upon shutdown for you
> If you're planning to use TAILS, it will scrub the RAM for you automatically when you shut down.
odd and unlikely attack vector, but always a target
??
The FBI has publicly burned firefox 0days to deanonymize Tor users at scale.
We're having this conversation under a post titled "So, you want to be a darknet drug lord".
If you want to be even a small time DNM vendor, you should not use Tails but Whonix.
But a browser escape is different than obtaining root on an OS that doesnt even enable root by default
like I said, different harder attack vector, likely under research
save the argument for someone more in denial about that?
This is a meaningless statement. Just because there is no way to log into the root account doesn't mean there isn't a kernel that treats uid 0 specially.
A linux LPE is worth a small fraction of the money a Firefox escape is. Far easier to come by, far weaker defences.
At least tails seems to use network namespaces now, so deanonymization without root might not be as trivial as it was before.
most of the stuff I find on Tor is very outdated, still enough relevant to piecemeal some decent OPSEC, but being able to bounce ideas of people objectively seems to be lacking - or I don't know the communities
there is the tor reddit page, but reddit is periodically hostile to tor connections. dread on tor is often down, so thats annoying, but I found onion services within tor often had the best information on using tor
/d/OPSEC and dread in general is a cesspit with few quality conversations.
It did. Whonix can defend you against malicious code running inside your work environment, Tails can't.
>Nobody is advised to run Tails in a VM, only as the host OS, so the dual VM part isn't that relevant.
This is why it's a bad idea to use Tails at all unless you aren't actually that worried about being deanonymized.
>The article does briefly mention Tails and how it does a RAM rewrite upon shutdown for you
This is meaningless security theatre.
Honestly, it seems like it'd be safer just to run two different machines. IIRC, I saw some instructions a long time back for turning a small travel router into a OpenWrt-based Tor router.
I haven’t touched Tails in years, but they used to have a pretty exotic network stack. I wouldn’t want to try to make that work with VMs.