If you are constantly regenerating uncompromised SSH keys, you are probably doing something wrong.
The GP is misleading in this way.
Yup, there's no real reason to generate a new SSH key pair each and every time you want to get a short lived certificate. The SSO or CA management system (like Vault) is responsible for verifying your identity.
It might make sense to regenerate the private key on each certificate renewal if the private keys are kept unencrypted, as they often are in the X.509 scenario. If the keys are encrypted and if your web server manages to get the password to decrypt that key each and every time it serves a request, then yeah, I don't see the point of regenerating the private key on certificate renewal.
I went through the article again. Essentially, rekeying makes sense if the private keys in question, whether they are host private keys or client private keys, are kept unencrypted on disk. Host private keys typically are, so it might make sense to rekey host private keys. However, if your user private key is kept encrypted on disk, as it should be, there isn't really a good reason to rekey.
The step tool seems to abstract that process and it also generates a new key pair on each login but that keypair never even touches the disk, according to the article. This makes sense assuming the step tool generates a key pair and doesn't encrypt the private key. In that case, yes, rotating/regenerating the client keypair on each login make sense.
> Signing certificates with your existing keys kind of make the whole point moot.
You mean getting signed certificates from a SSH CA with an existing client public key? Why does it make the whole point moot? The SSO is responsible for verifying your identity. Rather, it seems pointless to generate a new SSH keypair each and everytime you want to get a certificate and login to a machine. You can certainly do it if you want but I don't see the point. You can keep using your existing SSH public keys to get short lived certificates and login to a machine, do you job, logout, and repeat the process with the same keys.
One of the primary benefits of the described setup is that there would only be a single long term key. It would be managed more securely because it won't be lying around on each user's personal machines.
That certificate would only be issued after you've gone through SSO or some other certificate management process and it would have a defined expiry period, maybe even as short as a few minutes. It is a meaningful change.
When using key based authentication, as long as you had your public key in the authorized_keys file on the server, you would be able to login without issues, even if your keypair is compromised. With certificates, even if your keypair is compromised, you wouldn't be able to login to that server because you'd have to compromise the SSO/MFA authentication step as well, which adds another layer of meaningful security in the process.