If you are constantly regenerating uncompromised SSH keys, you are probably doing something wrong.
The GP is misleading in this way.
If you are constantly regenerating uncompromised SSH keys, you are probably doing something wrong.
The GP is misleading in this way.
Yup, there's no real reason to generate a new SSH key pair each and every time you want to get a short lived certificate. The SSO or CA management system (like Vault) is responsible for verifying your identity.
It might make sense to regenerate the private key on each certificate renewal if the private keys are kept unencrypted, as they often are in the X.509 scenario. If the keys are encrypted and if your web server manages to get the password to decrypt that key each and every time it serves a request, then yeah, I don't see the point of regenerating the private key on certificate renewal.
I went through the article again. Essentially, rekeying makes sense if the private keys in question, whether they are host private keys or client private keys, are kept unencrypted on disk. Host private keys typically are, so it might make sense to rekey host private keys. However, if your user private key is kept encrypted on disk, as it should be, there isn't really a good reason to rekey.
The step tool seems to abstract that process and it also generates a new key pair on each login but that keypair never even touches the disk, according to the article. This makes sense assuming the step tool generates a key pair and doesn't encrypt the private key. In that case, yes, rotating/regenerating the client keypair on each login make sense.