What commonly used authentication method doesn't have this exact same issue? Storing the U/P (which is terrible for other reasons) has the same issue. Using sessions has the same issue. Using API keys has the same issue. What auth method are you using that is somehow tied to the device that can't be trivially spoofed?
Tell me again how adoption-at-large of PGP encrypted email is coming along?
If your require these things, do them. If you don't, then don't.
People keep asking to have super smart locks that somehow recognize stolen keys, but how can they?
This is the same problem, just one level further down. The scheme depends on hardware acting against the desires of its owner—whether we're talking about the entire system or just the TPM portion. The privacy concerns are real but not the full extent of the problem.
You want the credentials to be non-extractable. The client wants to extract the credentials and use them somewhere else. Blind trust in an unsupported assertion from a client with diametrically opposing goals is not much of a security model.
Cant have Your cake and eat it too
> client fingerprinting is easily duplicated.
Far from it.
Or we could just use credentials that can be tied to the hardware, and then we have stronger security assertions than tying to IP, and without any degraded user experience.
AFAIK iOS provides hardware keys for fingerprinting