It's the same thing you should be doing on the desktop if you fear untrusted USB devices.
It's the same thing you should be doing on the desktop if you fear untrusted USB devices.
It's better to not expose the needless attack surface rather than just attempting to isolate the attack into a leaky VM.
What is the alternative? If you don’t use a VM you have to expose dom0 directly to device io.
EDIT: ah I see we’re talking about a Linux phone! I agree with your point I’m not sure mobile devices have the resources to isolate every component into a VM. Overkill indeed!
I’ve looked a few times for an ARM SBC with a nice architecture to play with this stuff, Nvidia seemed to be the only option but they are also unobtanium right now.
And the pointless supply chain vulnerability, introduced in order to game the FSF certification process, and lying about security features in their competitors, and accusing them of using binary blobs which they actually do as well while doing so with a worse security implementation.
>you can fix that quite easily with a bunch of udev rules, I guess
Exactly, why didn't they? I would understand if some of those were just teething troubles but that phone came out well over a year ago and bear in mind this analysis and criticism comes from within the OSS community trying to help them get this fixed, and hitting a brick wall.