https://twitter.com/BretDevereaux/status/1528581923446181898...
https://twitter.com/BretDevereaux/status/1528581923446181898...
> The thing is that things like anti tank and ship missiles are primarily defensive weapons, not offensive ones. Sure, a Javelin can wreck a tank, but it’s not going to break through a front line. Sure, a harpoon can sink a ship, but it’s not going to project power halfway across the world. A Patriot missile can shoot down a plane, but it’s not going to target moving targets 100 miles behind enemy lines, or provide CAS.
> Does this mean that in recent years that the power balance has swung in favour of defenders? Maybe. But that doesn’t mean you get rid of offensive capabilities.
My overall take away from the Atlantic piece is that they've fallen into the same trap as much of the rest of the internet. Large platforms have not been rendered obsolete because of the advent of these weapons, just as they weren't during the 70s with the first large battles involving Anti-tank and Anti-Ship missiles. (The former has a number of well-cited examples, but for the latter, I call attention to the Battle of Latakia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Latakia )
It's worth nothing as well that the Neptune AShM isn't really a revolutionary weapon, and is marginally improved over classes of AShMs developed in the 80s. It's notary comes from the fact that Ukraine essentially was able redevelop the capability of the old Kh-35, with modest improvements. It's not a next-gen missile such as a LRASM.
Similarly, the Javelin, while effective and having gone through incremental upgrades, is not a wildly new weapon. It's been around for decades, and as we're finding along with the Stinger, the U.S. needs to reactivate the manufacturing to build them from scratch which has been dormant for decades.
I draw attention to the fact that these are older weapons. Drones are giving troops in the field better ability to target than ever before, but the fundamentals haven't changed and the same difficulties apply. WaPo had an exclusive stating that it was U.S. Intelligence that gave the Ukrainians the necessary info to find and target the Moskava with their missiles. The weapons themselves are just one part in long chain of capabilities.
So that's where I think this piece misses much, because it's ignorant of some of the other elements of how all this comes together. The U.S. has been aware of China's long range precision fires for quite some time, and while they're worrysome, they're not terrified. To paraphrase a quote I heard, "a long kill chain provides plenty of opportunities to disrupt it along the way."
And that's where the Russians have failed. Not because they're being surprised for the first time by these weapons (they invented many of the earliest examples themselves!) but because they're not fighting effectively. As some commentators have noted, the supporting elements that would defend against these weapons are not in place, the systems designed to counter them are not active/maintained (which was probably the case of the Moskava), and the intelligence/reconnaissance that would have identified and monitored these threats are not in place. All of this contributes to failure.
The Russians are not getting wrecked by guided missiles because they're so high tech, they're getting wrecked because they're inept.
My understanding is that the U.S. sunsetted or reduced Javelin and Stinger production because of assumed air superiority in any potential conflict (COIN or near-peer).
For all of their love of redundancy, do you think that they are overconfident in air superiority?
I hear the "they'll rely on air superiority" bit a lot, but haven't read anything official that suggests that it's actual policy. It might just be one of those things that went unsaid as priorities shifted elsewhere. I think the Ballistic Missile Defense debate sucked a lot of oxygen out of the need for ground-based aircraft defense.
There's growing calls for more robust aircraft defense, both against fighter airplanes and drones, and it's getting some attention as you can read here: https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
I note though that these are short-range systems, and I haven't seen much new for longer range systems such as what some NATO countries are doing with NASAMS, and so it seems like things have been quiet in the U.S. for medium and upper tier (BMD being the exception.)
I've long wondered if there's hesitance to overlap medium and upper tier defenses with counter-air operations because of the risk of blue-on-blue engagement (See the Persian Gulf War and Patriot), and that it might be there reason why there's so little development in this space. Deconflicting those two things sounds rather difficult to me, and given our lack of success to date, the U.S. might simply have strategized that - with a few exceptions - it's best to leave medium and high altitudes to aircraft and just not worry about shooting down your own pilots.
But that's just a guess. It's an interesting question and one I'll be curious to see play out.
The Army has cancelled the following systems in the last few decades: Comanche, Crusader, and FCS. Yet it spent the money on these and only cancelled them when the costs ballooned out of control. Other than buying Avenger in the 1980s, the Army has almost completely neglected SHORAD. This tells me they don't give a hoot about the threat. Compare that to Comanche. They are all in on the Future Vertical Lift program. For Crusader, they've decided on incremental (and seemingly perpetual) upgrades to the M109. As well as investing heavily in ATACMs and PrSM.
I think they're slowly coming around to the idea that they need these, though it's arriving in the form of supporting roles and to solve a pilot shortage.
With regards to ground, many of those cancellations came about as a result of the end of the Cold War. Comanche and Crusader were both 80's era programs The threat of a general European land war receded tremendously. Had those gone forward, I'm sure they'd be useful, but aged now even. I do wonder how useful Crusader would have been, given the shift to highly mobile wheeled SPGs as opposed to armored ones. (See CAESAR and Archer systems).
FCS was later, and tripped over itself I think trying to make a series of vehicles that could do everything at a time when we weren't sure what we wanted a vehicle to do other than survive IEDs. They wanted air mobility (low weight!) but networking, tons of firepower, and be resistant to ATGMs and the odd buried 155mm shell exploding underneath it. It sounds like the Bradley all over again, but it's a tricky problem to solve. A combination of electronic jamming for IEDs and active protection for ATGMs might finally solve the problem. Might.
I think you're right about SHORAD, and given the aerial performance in the Gulf and elsewhere, they've had little reason to think otherwise. The USAF and Navy have been so effective up until late that the Air-to-Air squadrons have had so little to do that the USAF invented sorties for their F-22 squadrons just to give them a shot at advancement compared to their A2G brethren. And while the Russians have been cranking out one fancy Flanker variant after another, they haven't had the funds to build them in any quality. The PAK-FA has been little more than a demonstrator. And up until relatively recently, the Chinese have been struggling to replicate Western and Russian turbofan technology. Lack of decent engines has held them back for years. It seems they're finally turning the corner on that.
So yeah, they haven't had much reason to pay attention to it. Drones are starting to make them pay attention though. https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
Better late than never I suppose.
They're "getting wrecked" in terms of human and materiel losses, even though those seem to have stabilised compared to March/April, the reality on the ground is that the Russians have managed to acquire a land-bridge to Crimea and that they've mostly conquered the two regions of Lugansk and Donetsk.
Even speedboats with rockets or explosives strapped to them are a threat to warships, who were mostly protected by obscurity - finding ships at sea is hard. Drones negate a lot of that.
People will wave away the obvious by saying “The Russians are idiots”, “The ship was old”, etc, but the reality is a defender only has to fuck up once. The Russians should have (and may have in other scenarios) shot down that drone, but obviously failed.
Even the mighty US Navy has trouble teaching sailors to steer ships. Operationally the US Navy is exponentially more capable than the Russians… but remember, you only need to screw up once. Fundamentally, the current operating model of big navies is on a path to irrelevance. Nerds can argue if the early ironclad battles were truly relevant, but the fact remains that whether that moment was key or not, the end result was the same.
Other advantages:
- Quickly understand which tweets/sentences matter by scanning the likes
- Debate can stem from any tweet, so discussion is immediately less conflated and more focussed on specific parts or ideas
Twitter is good for one-off observations.
I've personally started a "microblog" for that kind of stuff.