Turns out it's very straightforward to use statistical analysis to get rid of the noise and adding a little more doesn't do anything useful. The most reliable way to throw off the attacker is to make sure you do the same amount of computing in every case.
"It's stuff like this that makes building secure systems very hard."
Do that enough and you get your info.
It is not that it is impossible technically , it is that it is no longer possible to use the crack to good effect [ie "practically"].
Do you still disagree - I thought it was a truism that increasing attempts meant the crack could become impractical.
You only have to calculate the random average once, and you anyway need to collect lots of timing data.
Please do not use Markov chains to construct posts or refrain from commenting on things you do not actually understand.
I did not claim that I'm an expert in cryptography, but I will tell you that my graduate course in formal cryptography has taught me enough to explain something as basic as key strengthening.
So, mukyu, perhaps you'd like to fill us all in with your detailed explanation of the number theory behind the Blowfish key schedule.