> If the security of your military operations are vulnerable to "random nobodys running bots that post on Twitter," your operations aren't secure in the slightest, because any slightly competent adversary can do exactly the same thing - and they probably already were.

Which is the exact message of the OP:

> Adversaries no longer need to rely on expensive radars to find U.S. military aircraft. The accessibility of this information demands a review of U.S. military operational security practices....

> Compromise Needed

> The information adversaries can derive from unsecured aviation data is far too revealing of mission-critical operations and movements. The Department of Defense (DoD), FAA, and other stakeholders need to reach a compromise that better balances aircraft safety and operational security. This agreement also should be coordinated with international air safety organizations such as the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and perhaps NATO as a standard operating procedure. A possible compromise could entail a peacetime mode in which ADS-B altitude and bearing data is transmitted but identifying information harmful to operational security is stripped out and a wartime mode in which DoD reserves the right to turn off ADS-B transponders in the vicinity of conflict zones.

There's tension between the needs of civilian air safety and military operational security. You don't want your military aircraft tracked, but you also don't want airliners colliding with them, either.

> Twitter has nothing to do with it.

Twitter demonstrates the problem in an eye-catching way.