P.S. Lots of hypothetical examples were given, but I'd like to see an actual case.
P.P.S. tptacek try to hold your tongue for at least a little bit before piping in with your usual response. :)
P.S. Lots of hypothetical examples were given, but I'd like to see an actual case.
P.P.S. tptacek try to hold your tongue for at least a little bit before piping in with your usual response. :)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking
DNSSEC gives you end-to-end protection against DNS hijacking if your local resolver does DNSSEC verification and the domain being looked up uses DNSSEC.
All you have to do is install a local resolver like https://www.knot-resolver.cz which does DNSSEC verification by default.
It can be configured to talk to your upstream DNS servers or some other DNS-over-TLS servers if you want (like the Cloudflare DNS servers).
It does if you run a local caching resolver with DNSSEC validation which is what I mentioned in the post you replied to.
This caching resolver works as your system resolver, i.e., it sits on your machine and acts as an intermediary between your local apps and the upstream ISP DNS servers to cache responses and also rejects any spoofed DNS response from the upstream ISP as long as the domain has DNSSEC enabled.
You are only considering DNSSEC from the point of view of a stub resolver, which nowadays is more appropriate for a microcontroller-based system rather than a modern system (including things like smartphones, home routers and cheap Raspberry Pi-like machines).
Note that many modern Linux systems and home routers already have caching resolvers, it's just that most of them are not DNSSEC-validating (by default, at least).
also, it'd receive enormous pushback from governments if microsoft/apple were to start validating DNS, as it would prevent them from blocking sites in the most common way, rewriting DNS queries for illegal sites (for example, in australia, we have blocks on various torrent sites like thepiratebay)
Sorry but I don't follow. The 99.9% of people that do not know what DNS is, don't need to know what DNSSEC is either. It works regardless of whether you know what it is.
All you need is for microsoft/apple to start validating DNS, like you mention below.
> also, it'd receive enormous pushback from governments if microsoft/apple were to start validating DNS, as it would prevent them from blocking sites in the most common way, rewriting DNS queries for illegal sites (for example, in australia, we have blocks on various torrent sites like thepiratebay)
No, because DNSSEC doesn't prevent DNS responses from being blocked, so the governments and ISPs can continue doing that.
DNSSEC validation only prevents responses from being spoofed/forged. The ISP DNS server can still refuse to answer queries if it wants.
DoH is what can prevent DNS queries from being blocked, and DoH has already been implemented in Firefox and Android as far as I know.
Also, DNSSEC and DoH can (and should) be implemented together, they are not mutually exclusive, rather, they complement each other, as DoH by itself doesn't protect against forgeries by the upstream DNS server.
Supposedly this still has some compatibility problems, which is why Fedora (at least) still has DNSSEC=no as the default, overriding the upstream systemd-resolved default.
It would be great to identify and fix the majority of those compatibility problems so that DNSSEC validation could be enabled by default.
Once a large enough mass of users would have DNSSEC validation enabled by default, the incentive would then be on the network operators to fix the remaining compatibility problems, as the users' devices would work just fine on other networks and they would perceive the fault to be on the incompatible network they were using, not on their device.
Obviously, an ISP can simply flip the `AD` bit in any DNS response it wants to edit.
... by default. Doesn't mean that the software doesn't support it (by simply flipping DNSSEC=no to DNSSEC=yes in resolved.conf). It also doesn't mean they can't switch the default once most compatibility issues are solved.
> Obviously, an ISP can simply flip the `AD` bit in any DNS response it wants to edit.
... which would be rejected by DNSSEC validation in the client.
Besides, many DNSSEC queries are currently validated by trusted DNS servers like Cloudflare's and Google's which don't flip the `AD` bit and can communicate to the clients via a secure protocol like DNS-over-HTTPS (implemented in Firefox and Android) or DNS-over-TLS.
So don't dismiss the value that it already has, even without client-side DNSSEC validation.
You're right, good point. Let's give up on DNSSEC then. :)
1) Some DNS servers don't yet support DNSSEC (presumably including the DNS servers of some ISPs?)
Presumably this could be solved by contacting the admins of the affected DNS servers and asking them to update their DNS server software. I think this is the biggest issue I know of.
2) The hostnames of NTP servers on DNSSEC domains can't be resolved when the client's clock is too out-of-sync.
As another poster mentioned, this is not an inherent problem with DNSSEC, as TLS or any other similar security scheme would have the same problem.
Presumably, until the issue can be solved in some better way, you'd have to have a couple of NTP servers on your config on non-DNSSEC domains or addressed by their IP addresses. For corporate networks, perhaps you could have a trusted NTP server (or servers) with stable clocks (or even GPS clocks) on your private network and address them by IP address.
Further: when Apple and Microsoft operating systems rely on the `AD` bit for DNSSEC verification, they are using the protocol as it was designed. That's what the bit is there for. The protocol was designed to trust the link between the OS stub resolver and the DNS server, because it was designed in 1995 when even small networks ran and trusted their own BIND servers.
You can see that this fully-recursive verification thing isn't what the DNSSEC designers want just from the fact that they themselves attempted to solve this problem, over a decade ago, with TSIG (iirc; it might have been a different weirdo DNS subprotocol). There was an actual stub-to-server DNS protocol. Nobody uses it because nobody in the real world cares about DNSSEC.
What you're really saying is that Linux nerds can just run their own DNS servers. They can! But we don't design global Internet security to serve people who want to sysadmin their own phones. It has to work for normal people.
You mentioned yourself that DNSSEC can be activated automatically by registries, like what has been done in Europe, so I don't really see that as being an issue.
Sure, you can fuck up if you start messing around with DS records and whatnot, like Slack did (and BTW, they're still using DNSSEC even after experiencing that outage), but once you start messing around with DNS you can also fuck up in many other ways that have nothing to do with DNSSEC. So that is not really a problem with DNSSEC itself.
> The protocol was designed to trust the link between the OS stub resolver and the DNS server, because it was designed in 1995 when even small networks ran and trusted their own BIND servers.
Sure, but we're not in 1995 anymore, so there's no issue with running a resolver with DNSSEC validation at the client level anymore.
> What you're really saying is that Linux nerds can just run their own DNS servers.
No, I'm saying OS manufacturers like Google, Apple and Microsoft can implement DNSSEC validation on the DNS resolvers of their OSes, just like Google implemented DNS-over-HTTPS transport (which also wasn't an option in 1995).
> But we don't design global Internet security to serve people who want to sysadmin their own phones.
Fortunately, that's not what I'm proposing.
> It has to work for normal people.
Agreed :)
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-121-en.pdf
The attackers took over the authoritative DNS servers and answered queries with lies.