Private CAs solve other problems for internal uses but not this big important one for the public web.
Private CAs solve other problems for internal uses but not this big important one for the public web.
Google has been doing a great job of killing the "personal internet" by making it undiscoverable for several years, but now that we require a third party to somehow be involved, and likely a fee of some sort to be paid- I don't trust that the likes of Lets Encrypt and its duplicators to be available forever, the original "anyone can publish" dream of the web is dying in front of us. This: https://justinjackson.ca/words.html does not require SSL in any form, in fact most websites don't need it at all- and the obsession with even blogs wanting you to make accounts and to have to login, its all just heading in a very wrong direction.
Its just deplorable to me that I now need a third party to essentially tell me that I can be on the Internet. Its a huge step backwards in so many ways. And no one seems to care!
> Its just deplorable to me that I now need a third party
You've always needed one or more third parties (ISPs, backbone, ICANN, etc), this is no different.
By the time the major browsers drop support for plaintext HTTP, that protocol will be as quaint and archaic as Gopher is today.
(and we'll all be better off for it -- good riddance to anything ASCII-based or unauthenticated)
[0] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/07/20/stopping-ftp-su...
That’s not comparing apples and oranges-HTTPS was originally just (and often still is just) plaintext HTTP/1.x wrapped in TLS. Whereas, SFTP and SSH are not FTP/TELNET over TLS, they are completely separate protocols. FTPS and TELNETS are the original protocols over TLS, but have seen only limited adoption (mostly in mainframe environments, in which SSH and SFTP perform poorly.)
Even HTTP 2 and 3 are just a binary encoding of the HTTP/1.x protocol over an encrypted transport. By contrast, SSH and SFTP are essentially unrelated protocols to TELNET and FTP, as opposed to just binary encodings of them. (The TELNET protocol is already non-text-based anyway-the data may be mostly text but the control messages have never been.)
I'd be more optimistic if not for the (cynical?) fear that those most in need of encryption will be the first to be denied it by the force of the state, a day only accelerated by its increasing ubiquity. Your government can force you to install a state-sanctioned CA cert, almost entirely undermining TLS from that perspective, which Google can/will do nothing to resist, and their parallel desire to deprecate plaintext HTTP is entirely orthogonal to this.
HTTP/1.1 will be obsolete when intranets and tiny devices are obsolete. Well, it looks like that could become true...
It does if they install the CA cert.
UI is not pretty, but not insurmountable on standard browsers, OSs, or phones, and there is no interference unless you are working on a domain-joined Windows PC or your phone is under some sort of MDM.
These UI issues with this process could be resolved by some browser UI work by parties that aren't interested in perpetuating the current status quo and can get past handholding boomers apparently willing to enter bank credentials into anything that moves.
Or just use Gemini.
The problem is that while you can still add root CAs on modern Android, apps have to specifically opt-in to user-added root CAs. They can ignore them as they wish and I believe they have to even opt in to third-party CAs. Needless to say most apps don't bother. This is a big problem with self-signed certs on Android. I believe this was changed in version 7 or so.
Not sure how this works on iOS but on Android it's really a problem.
4.2 Server certificate validation
Clients can validate TLS connections however they like (including not at all) but the strongly RECOMMENDED approach is to implement a lightweight "TOFU" certificate-pinning system which treats self-signed certificates as first- class citizens. This greatly reduces TLS overhead on the network (only one cert needs to be sent, not a whole chain) and lowers the barrier to entry for setting up a Gemini site (no need to pay a CA or setup a Let's Encrypt cron job, just make a cert and go).
I'm surprised to not see an optional response size field in the response header. How does the client calculate progress%? Reading....Gemini is fine. I love trust on first use for TLS. But there's no reason to drop HTTP/1.1.