You put in my mouth words that I have not said, so I will say more clearly:
1. That attack is useless.
2. Nevertheless, Gimli is relatively new and it is also designed for minimum cost, not for maximum security, so there is a risk that someone else could discover a real attack, a risk that is greater than for older algorithms like AES or Chacha.
3. There exists no practical 100% secure form of cryptography. Any choice of cryptographic algorithms is a compromise between the computational cost for the operations done for protecting data, e.g. encryption/decryption/signing/verifying and the computational cost for an attacker that tries to decrypt or forge the protected data.
4. The compromise must be chosen for each application depending on the implications of a successful attack. Some data is so important that it has to remain secret even 10 or 20 years in the future, other data is ephemeral and it does not matter if an attacker would succeed to decrypt it a week later.
The correct mindset in cryptography, like in any other domain, is to choose the right tool for the job.
If you want to use a $0.50 microcontroller, then you must use simpler cryptographic algorithms that can have an acceptable performance on such low-cost hardware. If you want to use algorithms that are harder to break, then you must accept to pay $5.00 for a more powerful device (at the latter price any decent device would have hardware implementations for standard algorithms like AES and SHA-256, so you would not have reasons to use anything less secure).