> ...
> Review GitHub audit log files for unexpected commands such as ... repo.download_zip
I don't know what you'd get from GitHub other than source code but the CircleCI blog post explicitly describes the attacker downloading entire repos as a .zip
But getting the source code is pretty bad by itself. Not from an intellectual property standpoint, but because I've never seen a company whose developers didn't commit live credentials into their source code.
Said company ought to immediately rotate the credentials and force rewrite the repo history to nuke the commit for good measure.
I don’t do that, but I’m pretty pathological about stuff like that.
I learned it from the company I used to work for, who were paranoid to the point of lunacy, about Chinese hackers (they were breached once, and took the lesson to extremes).
I don’t think they are an outlier. I’ll bet lots of companies are just as tinfoil.
It’s a downright unbearable development environment, though.
I’ve heard banks can be even worse.
The extent to which CircleCI has gone to eliminate all threats is... scary. They've gotten GitHub to invalidate any GitHub access tokens used by a CircleCI customer. They've gotten AWS to e-mail AWS customers if one of their access keys was stored in CircleCI. It's a complete and total compromise of literally every customer secret in CircleCI. I expect this will be the biggest hack of 2023... and it's still January.
So, yeah, I'm pretty sure customer source code is up for grabs.
> Review GitHub audit log files for unexpected commands such as ... repo.download_zip
> Updated headline to better reflect the customer data that was taken.
Probably should be updated on HN too.