This seems like a spectacular way to break permissions restrictions and escape data to non-authorized entities. If it's successful, it's the sort of thing that will be brutally blocked by IT all over the place.
Very slick, though.
Very slick, though.
To give a bit of a peek in: All of the session data we store is encrypted with a key unique to each organization, managed through AWS KMS. We've also built a fully event driven architecture, so every action that occurs in any of our services is logged and auditable. Access to our production data is extremely limited, with our default role grants not allowing access to sensitive data at all. (We have an in-app issue reporting tool to let a customer grant us access to debug data)
Overall, our hope is that we can work with IT departments to help them understand how Plus works, and allay their concerns if a company sees value in using Plus. Making sure our security model is top notch is one of the top priorities for our engineering team.
That way, if someone takes the url of the image and shares it, it doesn't work without the owner allowing it again.
Of course, this isn't meant as a security measure as it would be trivially simple to circumvent, but more of a way of keeping track of the general surface area of how widely shared and image and putting the power in the users hands to reign it in.
It's both a tech and management thing. Management likes the control and less risk, and having one console to login to as opposed to 4 makes things easier for IT.
Just a general comment.
I'll give an example:
We have wikis that are internally and externally accessible, with permission systems for internal users and external partner users that carry different restrictions (e.g., VPN concentrator address range restrictions). If someone tries to access a page in the wiki that they don't have access to, the result is the same as if the page doesn't exist. This reduces leakage from link-guessing (I bet there's still a timing side-channel attack). Additionally, if someone builds a page that uses excerpts from pages that they don't have access to, the excerpt will appear blank. This has led to plenty of funny meetings where one party was talking about a status or readout and the rest of the room was deeply confused (due to a lack of access).
This particular wiki is one of dozens of internal tools with similar (but not identical) compartmentalization protections that I use weekly. Unless Plus can safely and securely account for such restrictions, it's going to be a tough sale for us, and limited coverage areas from partial integration would likely leave the tool with usage start-up issues. To some extent this is a classic uncrackable nut, as the most natural approach (integrate with services and systems) isn't entirely under the control of one party. The next left turn is to integrate with popular software/service providers, something they'll resist due to the natural incentive to avoid disintermediation and the high risk of incorporation of other access models.
Maybe in 10 years Plus will have been the source of a comprehensive delclarative permissions modeling system replete with formally verified macro system composition (boil the ocean style), or maybe I'm missing a clever simplifier to address these and other headwinds stemming from business model and tech architecture intersections. Either way, the explainability of the feature and the end-customer simplicity leave me hoping that things work out. It'll definitely be an interesting ride.
> Source: <URL/WebsiteName>, <AccessDate>
B/c I feel like that is super common and kind of impossible to stop with a permissions approach.
When you take a screenshot, its contents are known and fixed.
When you regularly and automatically refresh a screenshot of a particular x/y coordinate part of a specific screen on a website, what happens when "positive customer interactions" gets moved, and "internal notes on this customer, not for sharing with them" gets put in that spot?
In other words, if Plus becomes popular, its database will become a prime target for hackers and three letter agencies.
What this means is that (whether now, or with an update that could easily slip the notice of Chrome Web Store auditors) Plus could direct your browser to take these actions on a domain where you had never explicitly told it to take a screenshot, using not only the credentials from when you installed Plus but whatever credentials exist on an ongoing basis.
Of course, this is also true of any extension that you grant permission to access all websites. But Plus has already shipped the code to access the DOM of arbitrary tabs already loaded in everyone's browser, and communicate that information to the cloud, without an auditable open-source core. I have a lot of trust, for instance, that if uBlock Origin were to start sending my data to the cloud, someone would post about it on HN. An attacker with the ability to send updates to the Chrome Web Store as Plus, and operate Plus servers as command-and-control servers, could do this a lot more subtly, and that's definitely a yellow flag.
The example video shows him taking a screenshot of an Amplitude dashboard using a browser plug-in. Thinking about how that’s possible, it must be skimming the session cookie off the browser, and using it to request the same page on Plus’s side to generate an image. You can imagine how that might be compromising.
Edit: you log in within the plus web app itself, which feels a little better. Still no totally secure way to do this but seems really useful.