Network engineers and the people handling network ops always amaze me.
Network engineers and the people handling network ops always amaze me.
A crash affecting both sides of a "resilient" virtual chassis I had to work with took off a major broadcast last year (it was a last minute favour I was doing, and I rerouted to a tertiary route in a couple of minutes).
Meanwhile I ran a rather large event going out to some hundred million listeners via two crappy £300 switches which were completely independent of each other, into two independent routers, running via two separate systems (one on a UPS, one on mains). If one of them broke the other one was completely independent and the broadcast would have continued just fine.
As far as I am concerned, that is far better than a virtual chassis.
The kind of bugs that I’ve read about in errata notes over the years is wild and truly unpredictable.
I worked on systems and platforms at the time, and we were more cynical even about vendors we liked.
Using multiple connectivity vendors doesn’t guarantee path diversity. Demanding fibre maps and ensuring that your connectivity has separate points of entry into the building, doesn’t cross outside the building, and validating with your DC provider that your cross connects aren’t crossing either, guaranteed path diversity / redundancy.
Of course I had one failure in Delhi which the provider blamed on 5 separate fibre cuts. Long distance circuits can run via areas where they can sustain multiple cuts across large amounts of area (regional flooding is a good one), and fixing isn't instant. This can be mittigated a little, but you still end up with circuit issues -- I had two fibre runs into Shetland the other month. Frist one was cut, c'est la vie. Second one was cut, had to use a very limited RF link. There's only so much you can do.
On the other hand I've just been given a BT Openreach plan which lists any pinch points of a new RO2 EAD install, I can see the closest the two get during transport is about 400m (aside from the end point of course, and experience has taught me I can trust it.
One of the problems that I've seen in practice that with the degree of virtualization at play that it has at the same time become much more easy to in principle be guaranteed 100% independence and in practice it has become much harder to verify that this is the case because of all of the abstraction layers underneath the topology. One of my customers specializes in software that allows one to make such guarantees and this is a non-trivial problem, to put it mildly, especially when the situation becomes more dynamic due to outages from various causes.
Sometimes of course you have to make judgement calls. From one location near Slough I have a BT EAD2 back to my building a few miles away. I know the route into my building, I can see the cables with my own eyes going in different directions. BT tell me which exchanges those cables goto, and provide me with a map into the field at a 1000:1 scale showing the cables coming in down a shared path. Sure it's possible BT are lying, but it's unlikely. Only use that location sporadically, and when I do it's a managed location, so I can accept the risk of a digger on the ground.
Another location in Norfolk, two BTNet lines, going to two different exchanges. They meet at the edge of the farm and go up the same trunk. That's fine, I can physically control the single point of failure there too, although if peering between BT and my network fails then I'm screwed, but I have a separate pinnacom circuit in a crunch.
Now obviously some failure become far harder to mitigate. A failure of the Thames Barrier would cause a hell of a lot of problems in Docklands, I'm not sure if any circuits in/out of places like telehouse, sovhouse, etc will remain. Cross that bridge etc. Whether my electricity provider will remain with a loss of the internet is another matter, so then it comes down to how much oil there in in the generators, and the generators of any repeaters on the routes of my network.
However the much easier to avoid is the problem of some shitty stacked switch the salesman says will always work.
If you’re buying SDN WAN solutions, you get what you get.
If you’re buying specific paths, you get what you pay for.
After that it went on different paths to three different buildings, which from each of those was then routed independently.
We take physical resilience seriously, as it isn't network engineers that do that part of the infrastructure. Enterprise network engineers then throw it all away by stacking their switches into a single point of logical failure.
(Still had a non-IP backup, but sometimes that breaks too -- just in different ways than the IP)
The first time I saw something like that put into practice was when an experiment in the oil and gas industry that was scheduled to run for years delivered their network design. On the runtime cost of the experiment the extra network wasn't a big deal, but a service interruption would have been and would have caused them to have to restart the whole thing from scratch. It's more than a decade ago and I forgot what the exact context was but the whole thing was fascinating from a redundancy perspective as well as the degree of thinking that had gone into the risk assessment. Those guys really knew their business. Also the amount of data that experiment was expected to generated was off the scale. Multiple petabytes, which at the time (a decade ago or so) was a non trivial amount of data.
..oh wait. see what I did? ahhAHAHA
In fact it could easily 2x the cost for the same level of quality, which is why it's almost unheard of for cloud.
The fact that it's more difficult and complex to have two separate teams manage two separate networks means it's more prone to error and misconfiguration. The reason it's not done has nothing do with financial costs but rather because it makes no sense, for the very fact I just mentioned.
Like two independent internets spanning from your server to my laptop.
Two completely isolated end to end transports.
That's what OP meant when they said you could make it more reliable by having a redundant network. It's just prohibitively expensive.
Then if one internet goes down in any way I talk to you over the other. That's a fairly straightforward fallback algorithm to implement.