Given that scenario the current CA setup just adds many more entities that need to be trusted on top of that.
> (you can't generally get signed name directly off the root)
Yea you can (unfortunately IMO.) Just stump up the money. Most people have no need for that though.
> browsers have no real influence with DNS registries.
I’m not sure why the browser vendors being in control of this is so much better than ICANN. Google has undue influence here IMO.
> They can kill misbehaving CAs, and have done so, to some of the largest CAs. But they can't kill a DNS registry;
I think the difference is that the DNS hierarchy means only one set of published records exist for a domain. It’s not like the Web PKI where other certs can be issued I parallel by other CAs.
> they can't even move their own names off a registry they don't trust (customers are going to keep hitting Google.com no matter what Google says).
I’m not that familiar with all the processes here, but this seems like an abuse of a registrars power. Surely the gtld servers can stop delegating zones to bad actors? Have there been historical examples of something like google getting hijacked by their DNS registrar?
> append-only cryptographic ledger (CT) that tracks every certificate issuance. That system doesn't exist for DANE
As conflicting records can’t exist it’s trivial for an entity to monitor the published records for their domain, and alert on changes.
> it doesn't work (for instance: large numbers of middleboxes won't pass DANE queries).
That is true for many things. I don’t find it a good argument against protocols themselves.