What is needed is less centralization, not more. I'll take the US society as an example: having congress, senate, president, courts, military, police, states, free press (with multiple participants), university etc means that to compromise democracy, you need to subvert many elements simultaneously.
Likewise, having DNS and PKI separate is a plus, as the cert is linked to DNS and finding a web server is done through DNS. To completely fool an attentive user, you would need to both fool their DNS and their pool of trusted certificate (or a single CA).
To increase security, we need more cross-linked layers that each require the other. We need to have more steps and more elements that a crooked player needs to control simultaneously in order to achieve an exploit.
For example, we could require multiple certs, so that you'd need to compromise multiple CA. Although, if you can add one CA to the trusted pool, then you can add 3, so this does not protect against actors that have access to the user's OS. But, on that front, if you got root access to a user's OS, you can do anything. Once you MITM them, you can make a user divulge their credentials. Only a physical fob with its own certs, DNS resolver and hardware-level private key can protect against that.