If there is no such property, then the anti-materialists can be safely ignored.
If there is no such property, then the anti-materialists can be safely ignored.
What observed properties of consciousness are computational? Are provably computational?
If you rigorously and consistently don't assume materialism, what can be proven?
All of them.
> If you rigorously and consistently don't assume materialism, what can be proven?
Nothing. Without that premise (or a compatible one), all you have is handwaving.
I note that, in your reply to GMoromisato, you asked for evidence. I ask you to meet the standard you expect of others.
That leaves the experience itself. It’s an experience of informational content, but is there more going on than transformations of information? What could that be? Maybe a physical substance, or a physical structure, in which case we should be able to physically synthesis consciousness stuff, or assemble a consciousness structure. What else is there?
> Is there any function of consciousness we’re aware of that doesn’t relate to information?
Maybe awareness of your own emotional state? (Though I'm sure that there are views where that also is information processing, and nothing more.)
Pain (and related feelings) cannot be definitively reduced to computation. I’m open (and even predisposed) to believing it is just computation, but it’s not intuitively obvious.
We don’t even know how to test whether an arbitrary system feels pain.
This is an assumption. Sensation cannot currently be observed, definitively.
If consciousness itself is not a process on information, then what is it? Another possibility is that it is a substance. Chess is a set of relationships between symbols, but the wetness of a rainstorm is physical water. So is consciousness an actual substance? Where does it go when we don't have it? Is it a chemical that forms at certain times, and is re-combined into another chemical when we lose consciousness? In which case we could synthesis a beaker full of consciousness fluid, or whatever it is.
Dualists say it's a non-material 'substance', but I don't think that's a coherent concept. It must interact with matter, or it couldn't receive sensations and cause effects when we make decisions. But how can it interact with matter and be non-material? If it does interact with matter, then it can be detected and manipulated physically. So why can't we find it? We've been looking at brain chemistry, signals and processes for a while and not found a hint of such a thing. Any other ideas?
I meant that pain cannot currently be reduced to computation. I’m open to believing it’s just computation, but it’s not obvious that it is, unless you assume that everything the brain does is. But then you’re the one assuming.
Evidence?
We don’t even know how to test to see if a program can feel pain, so how can we be sure that it is possible at all?
I’m open to believing that it’s just computation, but I don’t think our current knowledge warrants your certainty.