I mean, maybe it is possible to assign probabilities to future events that you have never seen before, but somehow I doubt it (with 12.88% likelihood).
You doubt it? That means you're assigning some underlying probability to the event (not) occurring. Why does it seem strange to you if people are explicit about their priors?
In any case, it is precisely my argument (and Scott Alexander's) that there are no events to which it is axiomatically impossible to assign probabilities.
I'm well aware of the nature of the argument, having been an SSC reader since long before the whole Cade Metz kerfuffle, and still being an ACX reader now - admittedly these days more to see what Alexander is on about lately; it's been some time since I've taken him seriously. A major reason why that's the case is because I've yet to see from any source a substantiation of that argument which is sustainable in the absence of a lot of handwaving. Granted, nobody waves hands like Scott Alexander! That's a lot of why I still find him so entertaining. But the handwaving is still handwaving.
[1] https://slatestarcodex.com/2013/05/02/if-its-worth-doing-its...
I don't know much about superconductors, but I do know that people have been trying to make them work at room temperature, and generally failing