People at L4 might not really like Google's process, but if some Distinguished Engineer shows up at your design review you're pretty much guaranteed to get some sort of valuable feedback. That is not a given in other organizations.
The problem lay with picking the cheapest contractor bids. If anything, the FAANGs should establish consulting arms for this kind of work.
The promo process is not based on value or difficulty, but on the size of the organization that one is running. This is also true for higher level ICs, except they do not manage people, but rather manage/lead projects (which then have a certain amount of people involved).
Here's a rough breakdown:
- L4 -> 1 person
- L5 -> 1-3 people
- L6 -> ~7 people
- L7 -> ~25 people
- L8 -> ~70 people
The approximate 3x difference between the levels is also found in other organizations, for example in armies: division ~= 3 brigades, brigade ~= 3 battalions, battalion ~= 3 companies, company ~= 3 platoons.Misunderstanding this is the source of almost all frustration with the promo process. This process is designed to build and expand the organization, not reward awesomeness. There are of course deviations from the simple schema I listed here, but this is the hard reference point.
But this is not just a Google specific issue, and it is quite widespread in the industry. Google however suffered from this especially due to its obsessive culture of pay-for-perf and by ignoring simple facts:
- inflation means that your salaries should raise regardless of performance. if you only tail the market by adjusting salaries only if the market changes, then you are 1 year late(at least). This isn't a problem in an economy with low inflation, but is a huge problem in one with much higher inflation.
- there is a significant number of people needed to maintain projects that won't show large impact. Those people need to be at the very least recognized and compensated.
- making new products is great, but it requires huge amounts of ressources to do at Google scale from the get-go. A wider strategy is much needed, which Google obviously lacked for almost a decade.
How would I fix it? Not get to the point where the shots are being called by people with 2000 direct reports, for one. Software has distinct diseconomies of scale, where you have a much smaller loop between "Notice a problem. Identify who can solve the problem. Solve the problem" in a small organization than a big one. But that ship has sailed.
Failing that, I think orgs need to adopt quantitative measures of impact (eg. X tickets closed, X customers helped, X new sales generated) along with backpressure mechanisms to ensure that those metrics are legitimate (eg. you can't just create new bugs to solve them; you can't just help customers only for them to need to return tomorrow; you can't generate new sales that are unprofitable).
But this is "some impactful stuff is unrewarded" rather that "hard stuff that isn't impactful is rewarded", which was the complaint in the post above mine.
Good entrepreneurs go into markets where the existing alternatives suck, and make them radically better. Most Google executives and PMs (most executives, period) go into markets that their company and all of their competitors already have pretty decent alternatives for, so the true impact is pretty limited.