I believe that, from a technical perspective, my argument is supported by this article [0] that I found posted on the ACLU website. This was a reaction to the FBI’s highly-publicized case against Apple in 2015 where the FBI, I believe, pretended that they could not break into the iPhone that had belonged to one of the shooters in the December 2015 San Bernardino attack.
The article I have linked describes a specific technical workaround for avoiding permanent deletion of data, namely, avoiding deletion in “Effaceable Storage” of a key that encrypts some filesystem data. This may or may not continue to be relevant today. A pop-up on an Apple page explaining iPhone privacy [1] specifically states that Effaceable Storage “doesn’t provide protection if an attacker has physical possession of a device”, but I don’t claim to actually understand the security implications of the statements made on that page.
0. https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/one-fbis-major-...
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/security/data-protection-sec...