(2) The number of Mac users who have both installed the private log debugging profile and also installed malware without knowing it is vanishingly small.
(3) People mostly use the profile temporarily and then uninstall it, so even in the vanishingly small number of cases, the window of opportunity is a lot smaller.
It would be a lot of effort for no return. Bad faith actors are looking for easy, plentiful targets. Expert users who comb the logs are the opposite of that.
In fact, it's a great deal of effort to find useful information in the logs even for good faith actors looking at their own machines, because of the loquaciousness of the OS.
Citation needed, especially when we know that spear phishing is the simplest of the known exceptions to this. I.e. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37720580
Keep in mind, crucially, that the aerospace employees were publicly known via LinkedIn to be aerospace employees. How is it publicly known who has temporarily installed the Apple private logging profile? Who besides the article author would even announce that publicly? Also, the value of hacking an aerospace company is known.
You can come up with any conspiracy theory you like, but the level of plausibility in this case is nonexistent.
But people basing their routines around the assumption that it won't happen to them, is why some notable attacks have succeeded.
Obviously you need to base your practises around your own risk profile and their will be a point of limited likelihood of useful return on effort that will be different for different people/organisations, but some should be paranoid enough to worry about that other 1% of attempts.