> This may seem obvious to you and others, but giving an LLM agent write access to a database is a big no-no that is worthy of fears.
That's...a risk area for prompt injection, but any interaction outside the user-LLM conduit, even if it is not "write access to a database" in an obvious way -- like web browsing -- is a risk.
Why?
Because (1) even if it is only GET requests, GET requests can be used to transfer information to remote servers, (2) because the content of GET requests must be processed through the LLM prompt to be used in formulating a response, it means that data from external sources (not just the user) can be used for prompt injection.
That means, if an LLM has web browsing capability, there is a risk that (1) third party (not user) prompt injection may be carried out, and that (2) this will result in leakage of any information available to the LLM, including from the user request, being leaked to an external entity.
Now, if you have web browsing plus more robust tool access where the LLM has authenticated access to user email and other accounts, (even if it is only read access, though the ability to write to or take other non-query actions adds more risk) expands the scope of risk, because it is more data that can be leaked with read access, as well as more user-adverse actions that can be taken with write access, all of which conceivably could be triggered by third party content (and if the personal sources to which it has access also contain third party sourced content -- e.g., email accounts have content from the mail sender -- they are also additional channels through which an injection can be initiated, as well as additional sources of data that can be exfiltrated by an injection.)