To me, this is the most worrying part: how did they get a valid certificate for that "Anna's Archive" domain name, so that their blocking page is shown instead of a certificate mismatch error?
To me, this is the most worrying part: how did they get a valid certificate for that "Anna's Archive" domain name, so that their blocking page is shown instead of a certificate mismatch error?
(Is there a way to permanently opt a DNS name out of such things, I wonder? It seems unlikely that anything would survive a DNS name transfer.)
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/prod-support-for-rfc8657...
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8657
Though if your threat-model includes local- and/or internet authorities, you probably want to start thinking about alternative roots of trust.
The default DNS servers used by ISPs reply with the government notice website’s IP address, instead of what other global authoritative resolvers are providing. HTTPS does not prevent this from happening.
Instead, I believe you are thinking of DNSSEC (1), which would prevent such dns rebinding.