My understanding is that the primary concerns with OCSP (meaning non-stapled OCSP) are that it (1) leaks end user intent to CAs, such as sites being visited, and (2) in its original form with no transport security, it is no stronger than the adversary that it needs to protect TLS/the Web PKI against (i.e., any network adversary can block the OCSP request and everything will fail open).
OCSP stapling avoids both of those concerns, but requires web server and other stack changes that are not on the "enforcement" path in the way that CAs and other "direct" parts of the PKI are. The talk infers that this is why OCSP adoption has been so sluggish (which I didn't realize was the case before).
FWIW, I'm sorry if I came across as dogmatic here -- revocation is conceptually important, and I think it'd be great if we ended up in a Web PKI where revocation was more effective. But I can also see why browsers have fumbled and/or dragged their feet on the CRLs and OCSP for so long.