Think of it as the continued decentralization that democracies are. The point is to increase the number of keys to power because then it becomes difficult to amass enough keys. If the politician has more aides, sure they can be corrupted too. But now you would need to corrupt many aides as opposed to only the singular politician. You can't just bribe the politician as the aide would then be likely to whistleblow.
Isn't it common for regulatory capture to happen with a "revolving door" where people move between industry and government, setting up future benefits for themselves on every cycle? e.g. Say Microsoft is really good, make a law that de facto requires their software, later happen to get hired there.
At least it worked once. I just don't think there is any special structure that can prevent corruption without human effort.
But I'm not sure how we can avoid this in any structure without significant consequences. Like if you say a government employee must spend X time before entering the private industry, what are they supposed to do during that time? I guess we could give them a pension?
But this is why I am connecting the concept of democracy to that of federated systems. Think of the fractal nature of this. We can draw groups around things and talk about consolidation. We need to think about graphs and networks. It isn't all there is to the problem, but it is part of it.
Let's pretend we have two groups that have equal knowledge and equal amounts of power. So in a perfect world, if these two were benevolent entities they would be equally effective. Group 1 is a singular politician. Group 2 is a politician with their aides. For all intents and purposes these two groups are equal other than the number of people. Is one group easier to corrupt than the other? Most certainly! Group 1 only requires that you corrupt a single individual. Group 2 the power is distributed (we don't need homogeneity here, but if it helps, that's the clearer case), and so you have to expend more effort to corrupt that system.
This scales and takes on a fractal like nature! It then becomes even more beneficial when you consider that there are many adversaries. There is a weird effect where you can actually have all keys to power (politicians, aides, whatever) be corrupted BUT where no single adversary is able to take control over the state! Because they themselves are in competition! If you have only a few nodes that need to be corrupted, it is much easier to perform a total graph capture because the power you have is also proportional to the number of nodes you control. But if you divide the power across many nodes, and you cannot capture nodes instantaneously and/or at no cost, then (assuming there are competitors) the steady state solution is having at least 2 entities capturing the graph, not 1. Essentially the steady state corruption solution is an oligopoly rather than an autocracy. We might call what we have a Plutocracy, but even though I dislike Plutocracies, I think they are better than autocracies.
I don't think there is a special form of government that can prevent corruption. Certainly not one that doesn't require action to maintain its state (which is difficult to rely on). So instead I think the main focus should be on failure design. Failure design is one of the most important concepts in engineering because it is taking control in how a system fails rather than letting it happen randomly. In something like a government you have to balance the distributed nature as well as the centralization. Centralization (with autocracy being the extreme) has the benefit that one can respond fast because they have absolute control. Direct democracies on the other hand have the opposite problem where the power is spread too thin and thus it is difficult to do anything because you have to do a full graph transversal anytime you want to make any decision. You need the balance for efficiency, not to mention that people aren't absolutely equal in skill and knowledge. But placing high importance on failure design in embracing the chaos and unknown of the system. Knowing that you can't control all parts and that once you've set the system in motion, you no longer have control. It evolves on its own.
But beyond the robustness that is created by distribution, I think there is a more practical aspect to this. The world is fucking complex and no singular person can be an expert in all or even many subjects. There simply isn't enough time to do this, not to mention each subject changes with time, so we'd have to do things in parallel. I'm not sure how to do that yet haha. So practically there is an advantage because you can out source this knowledge. Which this is happening regardless. The knowledge outsourcing is either implicit to the system or explicit. I firmly believe that if it is not explicit in the system then this only creates an environment that is more prone to corruption.
While we're on the topic, I think we often make a mistake when choosing the president. Absolutely no singular person is qualified. I fear people who say __I__ will solve problems, people who talk in the first person. The truth is that the world is too complex. The president's two most important roles are: 1) to be a representative figure head, 2) create a effective group of experts and be able to process and balance their opinions on their niche expertise. Even autocracies are having difficulties operating in the modern world due to this rising complexity. So I personally don't want a strong leader so much as a leader who knows how to manage and delegate properly. But even that's a difficult task.
But what you're saying is we still need to trust the congress person, otherwise they can just hire a list of names provided by the lobbyists.
Think about it this way: say you get your wish and we zero out the staff budget. The guys who were going to put their signature on the latest draft from ALEC are going to do it anyway because you don’t need advisors for that. The impact of not having those positions would fall on anyone who _isn’t_ just following the big lobbying groups - the staffers are the ones who are going to give them alternatives to consider and think about what they’re not hearing from the well-funded lobbying organizations.