What can I say? I've always been bad with names.
Like I said - I'm no expert and I've never read Wittgenstein first hand - but I do struggle when people casually dismiss the work of thousands of smart, sincere people over thousands of years.
Not much. But I don't have to know much to make my case here. All I have to do is point to the Tractatus, which really is manifest nonsense, and point out that publishing this bit of manifest nonsense didn't seem to hurt Wittgenstein's career much. Tractatus is not the only example of this sort of thing, just the one that sticks out in my mind as the most blatant.
And this is not to say that Wittgenstein, or philosophy in general, never produced anything of value. But the problem is that to find the value you have to wade through all this horse shit, so it's so much more effort than it needs to be. A stopped clock is right twice a day. That doesn't mean there is any value in consulting it to find out what time it is.
> Wittgenstein himself states that the Tractatus is nonsense in its closing pages.
> My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless...
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
I think you may agree with the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus more than you realize. My understanding is that his main goal at that time was to show that many of the classic problems of metaphysics which plagued philosophers for centuries or more are literally just nonsense. He didn't write the Tractatus to convince regular people though, but to convince academic philosophers of his time. He earned his fame by being somewhat successful. Rather than making a logical argument for his point, I understand his aim as stimulating his audience to think things out for themselves by offering them carefully crafted nonsense that gave a fresh perspective.
I think you just have no use for the Tractatus because you're not preoccupied with metaphysical questions.
You can choose to draw one of two very different conclusions from this statement.
And if you want to disagree with the definition of science that I'm using here then that's OK. But at that point, you're also doing philosophy.
And all of this is fine because there's nothing wrong with doing philosophy. It's not just a word for "the stuff I don't like".
Nonsense. General Relativity and Quantum Field Theory make plenty of falsifiable claims. So do current cosmological theories. Not only do they make falsifiable claims, many of their claims are in the process of being falsified right now by the JWST.
One of the reasons it's hard for me to take philosophy seriously is that I see too many people defending it by making patently ridiculous assertions.
> And if you want to disagree with the definition of science that I'm using here then that's OK.
Another ridiculous assertion. You haven't given a definition of science. But it doesn't matter. Whatever your definition of science is, if it does not include GR and QFT and cosmology then it is not not worthy of serious consideration.
> there's nothing wrong with doing philosophy
I didn't say there was. There's nothing wrong with knitting either. That doesn't mean that there ought to be knitting departments in universities.
(Though lacking falsifiability isn't necessarily such a bad thing even for scientific theories anyway.)
Of course they do, at least QFT does: the reason there is something rather than nothing is that "nothing" is unstable.
(And note that "something" and "nothing" in that sentence are terms of art with more precise meanings than the colloquial ones.)
https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.h...
Not to say science isn't useful or that it hasn't made progress in explaining things. But the line of thought that this question is related to is, loosely, whether there need be any ultimate, necessary explanation to things and what kind of explanation that would be, or whether explanations bottom out at brute, contingent facts. This kind of topic, regardless of whether your answer is a necessary existence or brute fact, doesn't seem to be scientific---or would you disagree?
That's a longer story than will fit in an HN comment. But the TL;DR is that once you have atoms, that leads to chemistry, which leads to biology, which leads to brains, which leads to consciousness and all the other interesting things that brains do. But these are all emergent phenomena. There's nothing brains do that cannot be explained in terms of atoms.
> whether there need be any ultimate, necessary explanation to things and what kind of explanation that would be, or whether explanations bottom out at brute, contingent facts
You're flirting with teleology here. There's nothing wrong with that. I'm making an observation here, not a value judgement.
It is an open question whether there is an "ultimate, necessary explanation to things". But science can shed some light on that by demonstrating that if there is an "ultimate, necessary explanation to things" it almost certainly has nothing to do with us humans. We're just the result of rolling countless trillions of cosmic dice in one tiny corner of the multiverse. That's not the answer that most people who ask the question of "ultimate, necessary explanation to things" want to hear, but all the evidence points to that being the truth. And so the best explanation of people asking this question hoping for a different answer is that they are engaging in the same kind of wishful thinking as, say, erstwhile inventors of perpetual motion machines. Science can't prove that it's impossible to do an end-run around the laws of thermodynamics, but there is still a reason that perpetual motion is the canonical example of crackpottery.
But the relationship between brain chemistry and consciousness is at best correlating certain conscious states with certain neurological states. The question is why there is consciousness at all. Maybe it's an emergent phenomena, sure, but it's not clear to me how the arising of consciousness from matter can be completely characterized through science. One reason is because science deals only with physical things, but consciousness is a non-physical thing. No doubt there is relevant science, but I don't know that science alone provides an explanation for why we are not philosophical zombies. You can, of course, take Dennett's view that qualia don't really exist, but in defending this view he did a lot of... philosophy.
And QFT explaining laws of nature would be strange considering QFT is included in the laws of nature.
>teleology
Well, I'm not positing that there's any purpose or telos involved in these explanations, just that there are explanations---there are reasons why things are the way they are ("why" in the sense of material or efficient causes, not final causes).
>It is an open question whether there is an "ultimate, necessary explanation to things". But science can shed some light on that by demonstrating that if there is an "ultimate, necessary explanation to things" it almost certainly has nothing to do with us humans. We're just the result of rolling countless trillions of cosmic dice in one tiny corner of the multiverse. That's not the answer that most people who ask the question of "ultimate, necessary explanation to things" want to hear, but all the evidence points to that being the truth. And so the best explanation of people asking this question hoping for a different answer is that they are engaging in the same kind of wishful thinking as, say, erstwhile inventors of perpetual motion machines. Science can't prove that it's impossible to do an end-run around the laws of thermodynamics, but there is still a reason that perpetual motion is the canonical example of crackpottery.
So my point here is simply related to your first sentence---there are philosophical arguments as to why there must be an ultimate, necessary explanation, and there are philosophical reasons to believe these arguments fail. But I don't see science as being sufficient for adjudicating this dispute, as I think you'd agree.
(I would agree with your point about how science shows us just how small humanity is in the larger cosmos, though I'm not sure that's necessarily in contradiction with religion. But that's a whole other can of worms.)
How ironic that you would say that in a thread about Daniel Dennett's passing. You have obviously not read "Consciousness Explained."
> And QFT explaining laws of nature would be strange considering QFT is included in the laws of nature.
You should watch this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1lL-hXO27Q&pp=ygUPZmV5bm1hb...
> there are philosophical arguments as to why there must be an ultimate, necessary explanation
Yes, obviously. There are arguments for why the earth must be flat too. Why should I care about either? They're just wrong.
I mean, Dennett is denying the existence of qualia altogether, as I said, via philosophical argumentation. The argument that science tells the full story here is itself a philosophical one.
>You should watch this:
Yes, the bottoming out of explanations is exactly what's at stake. The idea of a necessary explanation is that the answer to the question of "why?" is that it must be that way, that it could not have been any other way---that's what it means for an explanation to be necessary. And there are arguments why there must be such a thing that could not have been any other way, and arguments against it---it's within the realm of philosophy. Feynman is right to note that scientific explanations can go no further past a certain point. It's a bit ironic that Feynman was so anti-philosophy when he gave a rather philosophical answer to what might seem like a straightforward scientific question at first glance.
>Yes, obviously. There are arguments for why the earth must be flat too. Why should I care about either? They're just wrong.
Well, the discipline of philosophy also includes people pointing out reasons why such arguments don't work, which seems worthwhile, just like science includes reasons why arguments for the flatness of the earth are untenable and reasons why the roundness of the earth is a far better explanation for the data.
Not quite. Dennett's thesis is that qualia are illusions, not that they don't exist. Illusions exist, they are just sensory perceptions that don't reflect any actual underlying physical reality.
> The idea of a necessary explanation is that the answer to the question of "why?" is that it must be that way
Yes, I know that's the idea. But you can't get past the anthropic principle. Even if that is not the ultimate explanation, the fact that it could be, and the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that humans are not privileged in any way, means that even if there is a better answer, we can never find it because we can never rule out the anthropic principle. We have to make our peace with that, just as we have to make our peace with the Second Law and the halting problem.
> Well, the discipline of philosophy also includes people pointing out reasons why such arguments don't work, which seems worthwhile, just like science includes reasons why arguments for the flatness of the earth are untenable and reasons why the roundness of the earth is a far better explanation for the data.
Actually, scientists don't spend a lot of time debunking flat-earthers. They just write them off as crackpots who are not worth the bother. You're not going to get an NSF grant to study whether or not the earth is round.
I just mean to say that Dennett denies that there is anything that is "ineffable, intrinsic, private, [and] directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness". But my point is that this is a particular philosophical term whose existence and nature is being disputed, and that this is being done on philosophical grounds.
>Yes, I know that's the idea. But you can't get past the anthropic principle.
Well, the anthropic principle is more relevant for fine-tuning arguments, the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts, but that aside, my contention is just that this dispute is not one that science adjudicates.
>Actually, scientists don't spend a lot of time debunking flat-earthers.
I mean, sure, because the scientific arguments for the roundness of the earth have been laid out and there's not much more left to say, but cases don't generally get so neatly closed in philosophy.
All of this is really just to say that there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes. Maybe this area of discussion isn't interesting to you, but that's fine, not every subject in academia has to be interesting to you.
That depends on what you mean by "brute fact". Can you give me an example of one?
> there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes
And I dispute that, and I believe I can support my position by refuting that very claim with science. If it is true that there exist "areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes" then you should be able to give an example of such an area of discussion, and I predict that you can't.
BTW, I would like nothing better than for you to actually prove me wrong about this. But I've thought about this for a very long time and posed this challenge to a lot of people. If you succeed, you will be the first.
Since we're talking about contingency...
I'll just lay out a version of the argument from contingency:
1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed) exists.
2. All contingent beings have a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for their existence.
3. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings is something other than the contingent being itself.
4. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings.
6. Therefore, what sufficiently causes or fully adequately explains the existence of contingent beings must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists.
8. The universe, which is composed of only contingent beings, is contingent.
9. Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the universe.
I'd like you to tell me what premise you deny, and why you deny this premise on purely scientific grounds.
I will start by asking you to define what you mean by "exist". But before you do that you should read this:
https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.h...
But I will also happily concede that something other than the universe exists. Quantum fields exist and they are not part of the universe. (However, I do not concede that quantum fields are non-contingent. They may or may not be, we simply don't know. There could be an infinite hierarchy of causation.)
I mean, I'm not even concerned about the truth or falsity of the conclusion of this argument. I posed this argument to you, and right away, we've started talking about ontological categories and what it means for something to exist. Have we not already started doing philosophy? Wasn't this supposed to be a purely scientific discussion?
Potato, potahto.
> Have we not already started doing philosophy?
No. Establishing the meanings of words is part of science. You should read chapter 7 of David Deutsch's "The Fabric of Reality" and pay particular attention to the part where he says, "Languages are theories."
But maybe more seriously (and hopefully more fruitfully), I should ask, according to Deutsch's/your characterization, what would count as doing philosophy as opposed to doing science? I would normally say "the things that academic philosophers do as part of their discipline", but it looks like that definition isn't going to stand.
Bingo. You are using a much more specific definition than I was. As the other person commenting said - I was rather hoping you would grasp the spirit of my point rather than zoning on the rather hastily chosen examples. But let's stick with that for a moment.
I picked "Why is there something rather than nothing" because it's often used as the poster-child of unanswerable yet important questions. You have to understand it in that spirit and interpret "everything" and "nothing" in the broadest possible terms.
I wasn't claiming anything about the cosmology or quantum fields - I'm saying that "when you take into account everything science will ever be able to touch - there will be something that remains unknowable. (you'll find that at least since Kant, this is a fairly uncontroversial viewpoint within Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science)
I think maybe the reason you struggle to appreciate the value of philosophy is because you use the irreducible wiggle room that is always present in language to frame discussions in such a way so that philosophy is always at a disadvantage. You're straw-manning rather than strong-manning my points and you seem very keen to frame me as some anti-science merchant of woo. (A characterisation which anyone that knows me would have highly amusing)
I am a huge believer in the scientific method and it's primacy. But I don't believe anyone with any degree of reflection can maintain the view that every fact about reality will one day fall to science.
But this is exactly the problem. If what you meant to ask was, "Why do quantum fields exist" why didn't you just say that? Instead you asked, "Why is there something rather than nothing" which is a vaguely defined open-ended question with a lot of emotional appeal but no intellectual substance, i.e. typical of those parts of contemporary philosophy that are not part of science.
> when you take into account everything science will ever be able to touch - there will be something that remains unknowable
Yes, that's true. But it's not clear that what remains unknowable actually matters. We may never know why quantum fields exist, but so what? We can know that they were not created by a personal God who loves us and wants us to be happy or any such nonsense. We can know that our lives are finite and there is no afterlife and so we have to be judicious in how we spend our time, and so wondering why quantum fields exist might not be the most important problem for us to be addressing. It's enough to know that they exist, and that they behave according to simple mathematical laws.
> I don't believe anyone with any degree of reflection can maintain the view that every fact about reality will one day fall to science.
We know with absolute certainty that this is the case because (tada!) science can demonstrate this (e.g. the halting problem) so we have to make our peace with the fact that there are things we cannot know. But I see no reason to believe that any question that doesn't fall to science will yield to philosophy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation
Though you don't actually have to get too deep into the weeds to answer that question: what you should do is whatever maximizes your odds of achieving your goals. The harder question is: what goals should you choose?