What does that have to do with 'underlay networks' and wow is that "the root cause of 99% of breaches"?
What does that have to do with 'underlay networks' and wow is that "the root cause of 99% of breaches"?
But we should remember why it's not always considered best practices... you shouldn't assume that your private network is any more secure than the public network. When you have too many devices attached to that private (overlay?) network, it can be at just as much risk as if it was on the public internet. So, the zero-trust model is that you don't trust anything... public... private... it should all be untrusted.
Given that this was a "third-party cloud provider", I'm assuming that it was a credential leak and they only have username/password protections. Moreover, I doubt you'd have been able to add the provider's DB to an ATT based private VPN/network.
zero implicit trust is likely the best term? you have to trust something, but enforce (and therefore trust) strong (not network based) identity, authN and authZ. this can be done anywhere via a software-only overlay.
a litmus test is server iptables (to use an example) looks like: iptables -P INPUT DROP iptables -P FORWARD DROP
and the only route outbound from the server is to the private overlay on one port, and that server still can't make those connections unless it is strongly identified and authenticated, and the overlay will not connect the client and server unless they are both authorized to communicate for that particular service(1)
(1)so for example if there is a zero day causing the 'server' to try to communicate with some_IP then the private overlay will not accept the connection, even though it is coming from the server
I don't think any of this would have mattered to ATT, as the breach was from a third party that wouldn't have been on a private network anyway.
But, that would be a great service bonus -- only being able to connect to a service via a user-configurable private overlay network. It would be nice, but highly impractical... I can't even begin thinking about how customer support would be able to handle a scheme like this.
For more traditional single-entity networks, you’re right. But with more and more BYOD, those networks are at a higher risk than they used to be. That’s the reason for the shift… VPN tech is still sound, but it requires that you trust the devices that are connected to it.
If you’re now also trying to trust devices from your company and your customers, that’s harder to work my head around.
Yes, because 99% of attacks use the underlay network to access the target and exfiltrate the data. Said the other way, an attacker didn't physically walk into a Snowflake data center, console into the right server, and walk out with all the data.
After all, plenty of private overlay networks use simple username/password auth or no auth at all.
The critical part the overlay adds to traditional auth is making the server unreachable from the underlay networks, reducing attack surface by billions. Meaning:
+ Let's say the server did have good auth, but there was a bug, misconfig, zero day, etc. (one of the myriads of proximate causes).
+ Since the server is available on the underlay network, that vulnerability can be exploited by anyone on the underlay (billions Internet nodes).
+ In contrast, making the server only available on the overlay, reduces the attack surface from billions of Internet nodes to the nodes which can ID, authN and authZ (for that particular server) on the overlay.