What exactly is it Bechtel and friends struggling with? The OIG document doesn't answer this in a way I can understand.
What exactly is it Bechtel and friends struggling with? The OIG document doesn't answer this in a way I can understand.
This creates uncertainties, distractions and perverse incentives all around:
0. Everything is dramatically complicated by the artificial divisions of work across states needed to get enough political support. Grossly inefficient from the start, and inflexible into perpetuity.
1. Initial schedules are incentivized to be unrealistic, and not reflective of hard analysis/planning, in order to get funding. Easier to deal with the real details and expand schedules later, even though nobody wants that to be the process.
2. Essentially a cost plus (or cost even) program. There is no hard limit on cost, since the further along a project is, the easier it is to raise its budget, especially along with schedule delays.
3. Creativity flows to the most basic constraint. The most basic constraint is political will to fund, so top level attention goes to managing/manipulating up.
When NASA's hard constraint was time (getting to the moon first), creativity went there. They were never cheap, but they did operate with incredible speed.
Whereas any private company's basic constraints are relative profitability in terms of net return in a given time frame, so creativity goes to both speed and cost.
4. Boeing and other traditional large NASA contractors operated for decades under NASA's politically driven, cost plus umbrella, so continue to suffer from, and reinforce, NASA's problems.
This culture is hard to break, even after switching to a flat cost (still time flexible) regime. See recent Boeing troubles. Not just throw away rockets, but a much delayed, over budget, wonky one-way manned spaceship!! Ouch!
This is really the only problem.
Because the government was the only buyer - no one in their right mind would supply unless a ridiculously cushy contract is in place.
You're going to massively overpay if you're the only buyer in a new industry that requires insane CapEx and is high risk.
This is the truth, and while you could frame it as a negative, I see it as a huge positive.
Because NASA has been subsidizing space for decades the US has a tremendous among of trained workers for aero-space. It was exactly that workforce that venture-capital based space industry was able to source talent from. I doubt spaceX would have been possible without NASA dumping billions into boondoggles. Now it is self-reinforcing. NASA trained talent for/funds industry, industry now trains talent for/supplies NASA. Space economy the easy way, just costs a few hundred billion bootstrap it.
I see a clear split.
When NASA does something brand new, where private industry doesn't have incentives, it is a jobs program doing pioneering science, producing unique scientific and technological progress.
Since those projects would not get done otherwise, the inefficiencies are not really inefficiencies. Just cost of project.
But when NASA does something industry has found incentives for, the result is massive money-wasting redundant lower-quality, economically deadend work. The SLS is a monstrous parasite, tragically sucking up NASA/tax-payer resources. The only "purpose" for each build, launch & discard, vs. buying an economy class Starship ticket, is to "justify" the cost of doing so!
So I applaud NASA's manned missions in the past.
And I applaud NASA's current unmanned missions exploring our solar system and universe. And asteroid deflection missions. And human habitability research.
But manned transit, and near Earth resource missions, are best left to the growing list of companies that are funded, incentivized, better managed, and single mindedly optimizing those activities so well that they not only pay for themselves, but grow unbounded.
Can you or somebody elaborate on this? Is there an idea or a terminology or something I can read more about this? I'm very interested in the idea that you can pay attention to where the "smart kids" are going, to help identify where the most basic constraint is. I'm also interested in what the word "basic" means here. I'm familiar with the theory of constraints and the idea of bottlenecks. But that doesn't seem like what this is getting after. Thanks!
Actually, they were good, fast, and pretty cheap. The Saturn V cost per kg was much something around $5000/kg (compared to Delta IV Heavy at around $12000 kg), and could send a ton more into orbit than anything until Starship. If we'd continued down that development line instead of the insanity of the Shuttle, we'd really be somewhere today.
It’s not like that knowledge was forgotten and rediscovered post 1972.
And when a real challenger arises, you just have to hope that you can discard the old establishment and replace it with something capable of delivering before it's too late.
NASA is first and foremost about prestige (even above science IMO. This is also - again my opinion - why NASA hasn't been back to the moon in 50 years. There's little prestige to be gained for an expensive operation). With prestige as the backdrop, it makes them very risk adverse. There are layers and layers of requirements made to reduce risk. To their credit, SpaceX is willing to fail more than NASA and it allows them to iterate much faster.
This is also my opinion part of the reasons why NASA wanted the CCP to begin with: it allows them to skirt many of the requirements. The somewhat ironic part is that NASA pathways to alleviate those requirements, but it's somewhat common that project/programs want to go through the waiver process and formerly accept that risk.
There is a fairly well-known dynamic in govt contracting where a contractor low-bids to get the contract and then makes money on change-orders. If they were to accurately bid on all the NASA requirements, they risk their bid being so high they would never be awarded the contract. This is a similar dynamic to the traditional cost-plus contracting paradigm.
There is also some irony in that SpaceX may be the victims of the same dynamic. As failure occur, they may layer on more requirements that ultimately slow the process down (see the supplier quality issues related to an F9 strut failure). Given enough time, there is a risk that added requirements turn them into the dinosaurs they are replacing.
Also, as others have brought up, NASA has additional requirements they must manage (e.g., political risk) that SpaceX has less exposure to.
This doesn't appear to be the issue with ML-2, whose problems are closer to Boeing's subcontracting addiction than e.g. the F-35's sticker-collection approach to manufacturing.
IMO NASA has done the same with their selection of major center locations. It doesn’t make a lot of logistics sense to have your biggest centers in CA, OH, VA, and TX but it makes a lot of political sense if your goal is to avoid large programs being mothballed.
Good point, I'm unclear whether Bechtel was awarded the contract by NASA/Congress after selecting its subcontractors or before. (And if having a roster of subcontractors was an implicit ask from NASA or a decision made by Bechtel to future-proof their contract.)
We see something similar with Boeing, and while that was also partly politically motivated, there was also the financial desire to be asset light. The OIG's story about "one subcontractor, [to] which Bechtel allocated approximately 46 percent of the fabrication work to" selling off "all of its shop space to a non-NASA customer because Bechtel's steel fabrication plan lacked a signed contract with the subcontractor" forcing Bechtel "to find another subcontractor with available shop space" sounds like incompetence, not savvy politics [1].
[1] https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ig-24-016.pd... page 19
Major beneficiaries are the states of Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama (Huntsville) but there are beneficiaries all over the place. Classical DoD/NASA contractors know to locate facilities all over the country to maximize political capital via connection to local jobs in many jurisdictions.
Meanwhile SpaceX got reusable first stages into production, and recently got the world's largest-ever rocket to orbit and attempted to land the second stage. And it's all powered by newly designed engines that significantly advance the state of the art.
Some of it is reasonable. Covid threw a spanner in schedules and increased costs due to a rise in price levels. Some is from design changes due to new information, e.g. "during launch, the SLS generates exhaust blast plume pressure, random vibration, vibration from acoustics, and heat. These loads can cause damage to the launch vehicle, payload, launch pad, and surrounding structures. After the Artemis I launch, NASA found higher-than-expected thermal, acoustic, and blast loads to the ML-1. ML-2 project management is assessing these lessons learned from Artemis I and anticipates the ML-2 structure will require some additional strengthening to withstand the predicted loads" [1].
A lot of it, however, is laughably-incompetent cost-plus subcontracting nonsense: "While Bechtel revised its IFCs in response to the RFIs, according to ML-2 project management, the company did not allot sufficient time in its schedule to do so, and this iterative process resulted in cost increases and schedule delays. In mid-2023, ML-2 project management found the delays in steel fabrication and delivery resulted in a 3-month schedule slip, leaving Bechtel with no additional schedule reserve to meet the May 2026 contract end date.
...
In mid-2021, ML-2 project management noted that Bechtel’s 'interactions and business relationship with the steel fabricator deteriorated to the point of dysfunction,' resulting in unresolved fabrication issues that impacted the ML-2 project’s critical path. Bechtel’s lack of awareness and oversight of critical second-tier subcontractors responsible for steel fabrication contributed to a delayed construction start date. One subcontractor, which Bechtel allocated approximately 46 percent of the fabrication work to, sold all of its shop space to a non-NASA customer because Bechtel's steel fabrication plan lacked a signed contract with the subcontractor. As a result, Bechtel attempted to find another subcontractor with available shop space but was unable to do so in a timely manner. The delay in the steel fabrication process continued to impact the ML-2 project’s schedule" (pp 18).
[1] https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ig-24-016.pd... page 20
A lot of Artemis is dictated to NASA by the Congress. Look at NASA's deep science missions, e.g. landers, probes and telescopes. They're ridiculously advanced, creative and cost effective for the amount of science they deliver.
fun fact...its part of the legal boilerplate astronauts sign...
It's frequently called the "Shuttle Launch System" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuttle-derived_vehicle) because "it uses existing Shuttle tech!" was one of the big selling points.
In the last test flight, Starship reached a velocity of 7.3km/s. Orbital velocity is 7.8km/s.
Why didn't they make it to 7.8km/s? Because they choose not to. Starship had the fuel, control and capability to burn a few more seconds for another 500m/s.
It also (barely) survived re-entry and achieved a fully controlled, powered, soft splashdown.