>generate a completely random encryption key (in a TPM) and encrypt it with the password.
I don’t see how this approach solves the problem. If the password has bad entropy then using it to encrypt anything seems wrong.
>generate a completely random encryption key (in a TPM) and encrypt it with the password.
I don’t see how this approach solves the problem. If the password has bad entropy then using it to encrypt anything seems wrong.
In the real world, it's not clear that this is strictly better than using a slow password-based key derivation function. With a key derivation function, the attacker gets unlimited tries for all of time, so it is technically slightly less secure than "the key blows up in a ball of fire after 3 guesses". I don't have data on whether or not passwords are successfully guessable on average in 3 attempts, but they probably are for certain users. (You look at data breaches and if they use the same password on all of them, it's probably their TPM unlock password too.)
How secure TPMs are is also up for debate. I think I had an early one that was just a standard 8 bit microcontroller speaking the protocol the right way, without any actual security. That loophole is likely plugged for DRM reasons (software can ask the TPM to certify itself), but assuming that a computer running code you've never read has 0 bugs is unwise.
Of course, a real TPM won’t be perfect. But there’s no reason you can’t do both. Have the TPM use a good KDF and then an attacker has to break both.