It's only a matter of time that our maximally incompetent Secretary of Defense does something that leads to the death of our own armed forces personnel. E.g. the Houthi learning about an incoming attack and shooting down the pilots, or harassing and killing our Navy sailors patrolling the area.
I highly recommend reading Secretary Gate's memoir about being the Secretary of Defense for Bush Jr. and Obama. There is so much at stake that very few people ever talk about. https://bookshop.org/p/books/duty-memoirs-of-a-secretary-at-...
Fighter pilots aren't retiring from the military to fly private jets. They're graduating into executive roles that pay enough to buy a plane. Aside from the thrill of flying forbidden planes and patriotism, people cut out for and trained to be fighter pilots are undervaluing themselves in the military.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_F-117A_shootdown
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zolt%C3%A1n_Dani
Yugoslav spies residing near Italian NATO airbases informed the Yugoslav Air Defense HQ about lack of EA-6 Prowler electronic jammer and "Wild Weasel" anti-SAM aircraft launches during the late evening.By texts you mean the Wikipedia articles? Which details? I don't see much.
> Everything is vulnerable when coming into its own—jets’ aren’t at home on carrier decks.
How does that apply here? They didn't shoot down the F-117 as it landed or took off, but in the air over Serbia.
> How does that apply here?
Because jets don't materialize in midair when they're needed and disappear when their mission is over. They are logistical nightmares to plan for, and part of that chain of logistics concerns keeping your flight plans private. Otherwise, you risk pilot lives so your enemy can use 1950s tactics against you. Air combat isn't the Cold War anymore, shootdowns like the one in 1999 emphasize how important secrecy is in contested airspace.
Instead of guessing (wrongly), just read the Wikipedia articles.
> Because jets don't materialize in midair when they're needed and disappear when their mission is over. They are logistical nightmares
Yes, but the GGP says they are vulnerable during takeoff and landing, which is irrelevant to this event.
> This was a widely reported incident, it is highly-studied in tactical circles and information on the shootdown is available online and in print.
I think neither of you read the Wikipedia articles and that's why you don't understand the conversation. If you have something to add, please do.
The details in Hegseth’s messages would allow an actor like the Houthis to take out our jets on takeoff and landing. We tightly guard those details because they’re highly actionable tactical intel. The fact that a drunk TV influencer didn’t get that isn’t surprising.
You also wrote explicitly about Serbia, and implicitly if you look at the context: we were talking about Serbia and you jumped in to talk about takeoff/landing; it's reasonable to read that as addressing the same topic.
I didn't know you meant takeoff/landing for the Yemen operations until now.
Takeoff times and ships.
> didn't shoot down the F-117 as it landed or took off, but in the air over Serbia
In Serbia they had a full mission profile. The commonality is knowing where something will be when. The difference between the situations is hitting something low, slow and above a relatively-uniform body like the ocean is a lot easier than doing so when it’s high and fast.
Perhaps you have independent knowledge of the episode but the Wikipedia articles you cite only say the Serbs knew that the flights departed in the evening and that the mission wouldn't have its jamming and suppression support aircraft.
Anyway, I think we agree that the info Hesgeth reportedly shared would be a danger to pilots and missions if the enemy has any anti-aircraft capability.
Another way of looking at it was that hubris was the threat both times.
The Houthis have these [1].
[1] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-su...
It's reasonable to be critical of both details, but not to hold them in any sort of balance.
is it though?
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/apr/05/why-tr...
> as a first-term Trump administration official and ex-CIA officer, I believe the reason these officials risk interacting in this way is to prevent their communications from being preserved as required by the Presidential Records Act, and avoid them being discoverable in litigation, or subject to a subpoena or Freedom of Information Act request.
not american, but wouldn't the victims in this case be 'every american'? i suppose it depends on whether you think PRA/FoIA et al. are important in holding governments to account or not.