> No, you have to trust the one company, as well as everyone you were trusting before. You are still using the router, and now you are also trusting the VPN provider, as well as the nodes in between the VPN provider and your original destination.
As long as the VPN is up, the worst the wifi can do is cut you off. It can't alter your connections.
It's far fewer trust points.
> Also, you are just switching up the "unprotected stretch" between your local wifi, and, say, Google's servers, whereas now that "unprotected stretch" lies between the VPN provider servers in Latvia or British Virgin Islands or Panama, or whatever dubious jurisdiction, and, say, Google. Sure, you added a layer of protection against the random hacker sitting in your Starbucks, but you have added many more vectors.
When I use a VPN for protection, the server is in the US too.
And if it's for netflix I'm going to some major country, not dubious-land.
(Also I'd say datacenter and internet core routers are less likely to attack some random person's traffic, but that's not core to my argument.)
> It becomes the poison because the solution you are introducing brings more issues. And it's schizophrenic because the issue to begin with, was minuscule (a hacker stepping into MacDonalds, breaking the network encryption and then also the application encryption.
For most wifi networks, there is no encryption between users. And it's quite likely that the neglected router got hacked over the internet and is part of a botnet.
> Maybe if this were 2010 and websites still used HTTP, or you are using a local email client without TLS configured. But it's 2025, everything has HTTPs and you are using an HTTPs email client.
Until you type in a URL and HSTS isn't set.