If there’s a way to undo huge amounts of redactions, that’d certainly be a net negative. Sort of like if encryption were suddenly broken, you wouldn’t publish a paper saying so.
Our goal has always been to educate about the problem so that it can be addressed. We didn’t have resources to push on the font metrics approach, so we stayed mostly quiet about it.
I can't state emphatically enough how this is not the right mental playbook.
If you have found a vulnerability, it's likely someone else has too. By sitting on it, you only create more future victims.
Disclosure will lead to fixing this issue, mitigating it's precense, or switching tools/workflows, possibly a combination of. Sitting on it only ensures that folks who think they are protected, actually aren't.
It’s tricky stuff and we have limited resources, unfortunately.
What if you are not the only folks who have found and exploited this vulnerability?
You can play the "what if" game to justify not doing the right thing all day long, when really it should be one "if" that guide you. What if someone else found this?
While protecting victims is noble, something like this really needs the light of day and a truth and reconciliation commission so that everyone associated with the crime ring is punished and accounted for.
And no, if you do find somehow all encryption is mathematically broken, it’s your duty to publicize it even if existing secrets are jeopardized (you mitigate as best you can obviously in the short term) because it’s likely people more powerful than you might have that knowledge anyway and are engaged in asymmetric warfare.