https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/10/windows-11-the-ars-t...
> ... the best rationale for the processor requirement is that these chips (mostly) support something called “mode-based execution control,” or MBEC. MBEC provides hardware acceleration for an optional memory integrity feature in Windows (also known as hypervisor-protected code integrity, or HVCI) that can be enabled on any Windows 10 or Windows 11 PC but can come with hefty performance penalties for older processors without MBEC support.
> Another theory: older processors are more likely to be running in old systems that haven’t had their firmware updated to mitigate major hardware-level vulnerabilities that have been discovered in the last few years, like Spectre and Meltdown
I can't be bothered. My 80386 worked fine without any of the above and I still don't need any of it on a Zen%d (except Linux)
I've been using this for a few years now, and never had an issue.
https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Systemd-cryptenroll
> Imagine a motherboard failure and boom there goes my entire disk.
You can also set a long-ass key in addition to the other methods, and back it up somewhere safe. It works the same as bitlocker: you have key which can decrypt the drive without external help from a TPM in case something goes wrong.
Hold up, I'm no expert on Secure Boot, but LUKS allows you to have multiple entry keys to the same drive.
This means you can have one key of random gobbledegook which is kept and auto-used by the magic motherboard, and also a passphrase that you can memorize or write down, and either one is totally sufficient on its own.
You don't even need to set them up at the same time, you can start with one and then add the other as an option later.
TPM 2.0 is something else. It's typically soldered onto the motherboard as a physical device and the key can be generated and then used to encrypt the disk. The private key can not be extracted. Only the signature and you can ask the TPM to sign a binary blob with the private key while providing you the public key to verify. This protects you against physical access to your device. No one can take your disk and decrypt it.
Right, you can't recover or copy that specific key, but you also don't have to for accessing your data, if you set up some redundancy before disaster struck.
AFAIK: 99% of your storage is encrypted by a giant fixed unchanging master-key, and that is itself encrypted again with a non-master key/LS or passphrase, which is stored in the remaining "LUKS header". There's room to store multiple copies of the same master-key encrypted with different non-master options.
In that model, the TPM is simply providing (in a convoluted way) its own passphrase for one of those co-equal slots, so having one or more alternates prepared is sufficient to protect your drive from motherboard failure.
If it was 2000 - it'd be like, "OK boss, you gotta upgrade that old dog of a CPU", but software bloat really hasn't kept up with CPU performance. I've got an i3 which is serviceable enough from 2014. Is it going to be able to keep up with modern SQL Server and Teams and VSCode and all that? Probably not all at once. But totally fine for basic computing.