So I agree with you, it ought to be illegal for them to tell a supplier what other suppliers to use. But that is exactly the larger point here in the first place that they should not be doing that at all.
So I agree with you, it ought to be illegal for them to tell a supplier what other suppliers to use. But that is exactly the larger point here in the first place that they should not be doing that at all.
Anthropic is uniquely interested in introducing itself as an external enforcer of US law, a sort of belt-and-suspenders approach, where the Department is not only subject to operate under the constitution and the laws from the legislative branch, but also subject to anthropics interpretation of whether they are operating under the constitution and the laws from the legislative branch.
The department of defense does not want to engage in massive domestic surveillance beyond what the law allows them to do. They have signed agreements with OpenAI and other vendors which reiterate that they do not wish to use AI systems for massive domestic surveillance. These terms were unsatisfactory for Anthropic, for whatever reason.
The problem is not the terms of the agreement. It’s the people and the way they conduct business. It’s the fact that they’ve expressed a willingness to hold their product (or future products) hostage, at the cost of DoD operational excellence. It’s the fact that they’re training a specific model variant for government usage with extra guardrails and limitations and values.
Above all else, it’s the fact that they want to leverage their position as a leading AI company to influence government policy. This is not how a serious reliable partner of the government behaves. The problem from the DoDs perspective is the company itself and the people in charge of it.
Ceasing to contract with them directly doesn’t change the fact that Anthropic wishes to leverage itself to influence the government. That doesn’t go away. The problem is not with closing all direct contracts between the Pentagon and Anthropic, those don’t matter, it’s with closing all their channels of influence into DoD as a subcontractor.
Similarly to how DoD refusing to buy from Huawei doesn’t protect DoD from their prime contractors buying Huawei gear, they need a supply chain risk designation to ensure they are protected.
> is liable to act adversarially
...
> wishes to leverage itself to influence the government
This goes way beyond the above requirement of "all legal purposes", and I haven't seen anything that remotely supports these in the public evidence. In fact there's a lot of evidence to support the opposite view.
Are you new here?!