My private SSH key is rooted in hardware and can't even be extracted. This is awesome, I don't have to worry about it getting compromised.
The same should apply to all other keys, including the dreaded "bearer tokens".
My private SSH key is rooted in hardware and can't even be extracted. This is awesome, I don't have to worry about it getting compromised.
The same should apply to all other keys, including the dreaded "bearer tokens".
It still would be a good idea just to make sure that it's easier to analyze logs, but it's not strictly needed.
And if you want to be EVEN more pedantic, on most touch-based keys, you have to touch within 10–15 seconds otherwise it times out.
So it is not a waste of effort at all. First the need to touch at all eliminates a large chunk of attacks. Second the need to touch within 10–15 seconds eliminates a whole bunch more.
There would have to be some heavy-duty alignment of ducks going on to get past a touch requirement.
Even more if the target has touch AND PIN enabled.
Except the three pretty major things that do stop malware that you mentioned ;)
Perhaps especially "3. You don’t have touch to auth turned on".
There are several options for setting up per-connection keys that are dispensed to users through the company SSO. That setup means you don't need to maintain separate infrastructure for (de-)provisioning SSH keys.
The target machines then just need to put the CA cert in the authorized_keys files.
The word "just" is doing a lot of work there. You update authorized_keys every hour for your entire fleet?
It is the user machine that needs new certificate signed by the CA once the short-lived one expires.
Ahh, now you have three problems…hrm
Its still early, but my aim for this project is to be the simplest/easiest "SSH login via SSO" available on the market. open for feedback & suggestion