There is shifting burdens from good to good or person to person.
I find it no surprise that so many of the loudest proponents for georgism are highly compensated tech workers with low physical consumption - exactly the demographic that would be favored most under that system.
Instead the people who benefit from the infrastructure have the bill for the public transportation system rolled into their land value tax.
Right now in the current system you pay both income taxes and then you pay the landlord again because to him as the monopoly owner of land, the public infrastructure is pure producer surplus.
The demographic that would be favoured under that system is people who work for a living and the people being disadvantaged are the ones sitting on land or extracting the producer surplus.
Georgism does a excellent job of incentivising better land use, but is trivial to shelter income from.
A teacher renting a run down aprtment might have a similar land tax footprint to a tech ceo in a taller building, or maybe the ceo just teleworks from home in Wyoming.
xAI or whomever puts their next Mega server farm on undesirable land, and then operates basically tax-free.
The end of day problem with the Georgist theory is that we now live in a knowledge and information economy, not an industrial one governed by material inputs. Changing a 1 to a 0 on a string of bits might yeild a billion dollar profit, but requires no material overhead.
It's to 1) fund services while 2) minimizing distortions.
If someone can consume land of no value and produce huge amounts of value from it, that's a good thing. They should be entitled to as much upside as they can produce.
That said, the point of a taxation scheme is not to "minimize distortions". If you think that is important, thats fine, but it isn't a commonly held position.
Funnily, It is mostly Georgists that think it is a very important property of a tax.
I dont care if a tax has zero distortion when it is levied predominantly on one person to benefit another, or levied on the masses to benefit the few. Those who get the lion's share of the benefit should carry the lion's share of the cost.
Distortion has a very specific economic meaning which has nothing to do with who benefits and how much.
For example, a fuel tax to fund highway maintenance is distortionary but appropriate in my view.
Paying for the cost of wear and tear is a "distortion", because it changes the amount consumed. I argue that the cost of maintaining and building roads should factor into road consumption decisions!
Another example, If people want to live in remote fire-prone areas, they should pay more taxes to account for the higher state costs of infrastructure and safety, not fewer taxes because the land is cheaper than urban zones. The people driving the cost would be disconnected from the burden, and incentivized to drive them higher!
Distortion is a feature, not a bug.
Distortion isn't just "produces different behavior," because if it were, then any tax change in any direction to anything would be distortionary. Distortion is when a tax produces less-efficient behavior. For goods like roads, the inefficient-behavior state is the one created by not having consumption taxes.
The un-priced state of government infrastructure and service use is a market failure, but this is exactly what modern georgism and LVT calls for in its myopic focus on land and natural resources!
Georgism actually does not argue against Pigouvian taxes or use taxes per se. His view is more that you should expect to get less of whatever you tax. In this case, our shared view is that you actually want to tax road usage because you want less of it. I doubt George thought that people should use roads less, so I presume he wouldn't have been fond of the idea of taxing their use.
And it's worth noting the vast majority of LVTers or Georgists are not "single-taxers." They typically would believe that no tax scheme in lieu of a high LVT will produce desirable results, but not necessarily that any additional taxes on top of an LVT are necessarily bad.
I think single taxers or mostly single taxers have bad policy, and also overestimate the difference in revenue from current property taxation of land and improvements. I most often hear it as an alternative to income taxes and paired as a funding source for universal healthcare and UBI.
I haven't read Progress and Poverty but my understanding is George wanted to abolish state-sponsored charity/welfare.
I think LVT as a social solution to poverty is largely out of date, and more of a niche policy fix for some urban NIMBY problems. Particularly because modern modes of consumption, value production, and (dare I say it) rent seeking have grown beyond material inputs.
I think George's view on state-sponsored charity/welfare is more nuanced than that. It's a bit analogous to the prior argument. It's not that charity is bad, it's that in the absence of LVT, it will never be sufficient to solve the problem because a large portion of the intervention will get eaten by land rents. Basically that land rents rise to an equilibrium of "there's some poverty", no matter how much money you dump into the demand side.
Here's evidence of exactly that dynamic with a similar intervention of minimum wage increases: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S00941...
Temporary reduction in evictions, then rents rise to equilibriate back at "there are some evictions." There is some set point of eviction rate that landlords as a whole are comfortable with, and they will set their prices to whatever is needed to achieve that rate.
He also seemed to believe that LVT itself would achieve the most aspirational visions of charity/welfare, so maybe (hopefully!) it would be unnecessary, but I don't remember him taking aim at charity/welfare as a concept.
IMO the right way to think about LVT is this:
Without LVT, virtually no other interventions can achieve shared prosperity. Minimum wage, UBI, public housing, rent controls, even just the advancement of technology itself... they all either equilibriate into higher land rents, OR they require controls on land rents that create catastrophically inefficient use of resources anyway.
Virtually every political persuasion favors some types of Pigouvian taxes, which are deliberately designed to do this, but which believe that it's generally good for a tax to be distortive by its own merits?
So as you point out, one large segment of voters are interested in pigovian taxes. I think there is also a large overlapping segment that want taxes to optimize or reform behavior absent externalities for things they don't like.
However, I think the biggest moral consensus amongst voters is for taxes levied on the beneficiaries from the public work or institutions funded.
The public cares not if a tax has absolutely zero distortion when it is levied on the masses to benefit the few.
This more resembles income, profit, or use taxes.
While it obviously encourages putting high value land to greater use, it also encourages avoiding high value land itself.
If the tax burden of your San Francisco house or office doubles, you may look into relocating to where land is cheaper.
It obviously depends on the rates.
Because in my experience talking with them, most don't, and the vast majority are anti-federal organizations of any kind. And these have been multiple discussions over the course of 20+ years.
Now granted, among the people who are actually free-thinkers and have their own opinions, you will find many libertarian-adjacent views, but I've found that those people do not refer to themselves as libertarians.
there's also a difference between Libertarians and libertarians. im not american so i refer to the latter but i know what u mean