If your interceptors are good eventually the enemy is going to give up on that attack mode. - you have more incentive to defend than they do to conduct useless attacks.
If your interceptors are good eventually the enemy is going to give up on that attack mode. - you have more incentive to defend than they do to conduct useless attacks.
Ukraine's interceptors for cheap drones are drones that are even cheaper and so advantage defender.
For a facility that Ukraine has decided would cause $10m in economic damage if hit by a Russian drone, how much should Ukraine spend on interception for that site to not make it worth Russia's expense to target it? Let's assume a Russian drone is $100k (current estimate in news for Geran-5 jet-powered drones). But Ukraine can build their Bars interceptor drone for half the cost at just $50k (low estimate from public rumours/reports). It wouldn't be worth Russia's expense to send more than 100 drones in a salvo at this target. For Ukraine, they should defend the site with $5m worth of Bars interceptor drones, assuming a very favourable 100% success rate (actual reported success rates are reported by media to be just 30%). Russia has now made every $10m facility in Ukraine cost $15m (+50% increase).
The defender is essentially forced to find a 10:1 or better cost advantage for their interceptors vs. incoming drones. This is hard to do when an interceptor and attack drone are substantially the same except for larger fuselage (cheap), larger fuel tank (cheap) and larger engine (possibly cheaper than making a small engine).
And perhaps that is the reason Russia and Ukraine are largely focussed on attack rather than defence in the hope of being first to cripple the other's economy and supply chain for munitions.
This is likely a a flattened curve after you enter ballistic missile territory.