Makes sense. On not being able to get read-only creds from the endpoint: that's actually where a proxy helps most. A big part of what we've built is giving you fine-grained permissions even when the underlying provider doesn't have them. The key can be full-power, but the agent only ever reaches the API through the proxy, so "GET only under these paths" is enforced there and a write never reaches the provider even though the key could do it.

On the compliance subagent, the one thing I'd watch is that it reads the same untrusted context as the agent, so it can be injected too. We treat the model as advisory only. We have an AI review rule that rates a request's risk, but it can only escalate to a human approval. It can't deny, and it can't allow anything the deterministic rules didn't already allow, so a fooled reviewer costs you an extra approval, never a bad action. Your impact-level classification maps pretty directly onto that.