1) If a firm spends $99k on compute to replace a $100k engineer and produces 5x the output, how is that not a 5x increase in aggregate labor productivity?
The firm is spending $99k on
tokens to replace $100k in labor. The token provider is spending $
x on compute to give $
p•x productivity output to the firm. The token provider can choose
x at inference time and adjust
p at training time, so they control
p•x . They do have to make it greater than the firm’s current output so the firm will buy from them, but otherwise their profit incentive wants to make
x as small as possible - if 110% of previous output suffices, it is strictly a loss to spend more to reach 500%.
(Also, pedantically, compute is not labor - if you 5x output and 0x labor, the labor productivity statistic becomes “what’s the ratio of 5/0 to 1/1?” ie undefined. But that’s not a very interesting point.)
Note closely the “middleman” vibe of this arrangement: the firm does not spend on compute to get output; the firm spends on tokens and then the token-provider spends on compute to get output, and then hands the output back to the firm. Rather than put in x and get back f(x), they put in x and get back e(f(g(x))), where e and g are the middleman’s extractive greed functions.
2) …why wouldn’t a competitor with an identical 1¢ machine sell it for 50¢ or 10¢ to take 100% of your business?
If they were in the business of free market value creation, they probably would! I don’t know exactly how economists would describe it, but empirically, it seems the business of rent extraction has a different dynamic - one which can roughly be summarized as “competition shrinks the size of the pie, rather than growing it”, so all participants are mutually incentivized to treat competition as a cost to be avoided.